Where We’re At

How Fares the Fascism Thesis?

Tonight from 8 PM, I’ll be doing a livestream with Jamelle Bouie of The New York Times to discuss the midterms. You can tune in on Jamelle’s YouTube channel, and I believe we’ll also have a link that we’ll drop on BlueSky, Twitter, and here in the chat and on “Notes.”

---

Almost exactly two years ago, I wrote a piece called “Testing the Fascism Thesis” with the subtitle “Keeping Myself Honest.” In it, I attempted to make the case that the fascism analogy wasn’t merely a piece of alarmist rhetoric but actually was a useful tool to assess the Trump movement and regime, and it even had some predictive power. I likened it to a “research programme” as described by the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos. In his theory, a “degenerating research programme” merely explains retroactively and alters its hypotheses to accommodate an emerging reality, but a “progressive research programme” will actually predict novel phenomena. I believed that the fascism research programme, as it were, had already proved itself to be progressive: believers that Trumpism had a lot in common with historic fascism predicted that something like January 6th would happen; doubters mocked this as mere hysteria. The fact that it didn’t work is immaterial, a little like saying that a diagnosis of cancer is false because the patient didn’t die. Of course, there are many different types and severities of cancer.

Back in November 2024, I hazarded 12 predictions of what a Trump regime might do if one understood it to be fascist or fascioid. I’d not invoke the philosophy of science today. I’ve become much more interested in what the Aristotelian tradition has to tell us about politics. For Aristotle, a historical analogy is part of a body of practical wisdom. It helps us judge a particular situation and deliberate on how to respond. Reasoning about real political events always deals with what’s merely probable: we can’t demonstrate our propositions with scientific certainty; we must always judge and therefore approximate, but we can do so with greater or lesser accuracy and revise our judgments based on the evidence. I’d probably say that the fascism analogy is an instance of what Aristotle called a paradeigma—the origin of our term “paradigm”—or reasoning by example, where one uses a historical case to illuminate a yet-unknown present one, proceeding from part to part, or “like to like.” In the Rhetoric, there’s a very apt example: Dionysius of Syracuse requested bodyguards; therefore it was reasonable to argue that he was planning a tyranny, since Peseistratus and Theaganes of Megara did the same before they installed their own tyrannies. In like manner, if Trump or his cronies are doing something that Mussolini or Hitler did, it might be reasonable to suspect they have similar designs. Fascism is just one analogy, one paradigm of political judgment, but it’s not the only one, nor even necessarily the best one, especially if applied in isolation or in a dogmatic and blinkered way. But I still insist it does supply something valuable to our understanding, especially if properly qualified and combined with other examples and experiences.

Anyway, all that theoretical throat clearing is sort of neither here nor there. The initial exercise stands, and right before the midterms, I’d like to go through the list and see what has come true and what hasn’t.

The use of state-tolerated or encouraged mobs, either organized into paramilitaries or quasi-organized, to physically intimidate, maim, or kill political enemies and even unreliable allies. This is a big one and arguably already has come true. If this is a regular part of the politics of the next few years, I think the fascism thesis is in pretty good shape.

It came true on January 6th, but then it really didn’t develop. Paramilitaries and street fighters are not really a part of the political practice of Trumpism 2.0. The Proud Boys are not out there cracking skulls; The militias are not roving the streets of American cities. Researcher Dan Trombly, who wrote a guest post on political violence for this newsletter, called this a “failure to become fascist”: “the rise and decline of streetfighters as symptomatic of their failure to generate a dynamic fascist force within the MAGA movement.” I think this is very well-observed: there has been a marked sense of disappointment and failure of the most fascist elements within MAGA among the extreme right.

The use of mobs/paramilitaries as deputies to general state repression of dissent. This also would be a big red flag, but I have less confidence in this coming true. I think the cops will be enough.

Similar to the above. There are, however, two things to consider: First, there have been quite a bit of death threats and harassment directed at those who obstruct the administration—particularly judges and their families—suggesting that decentralized intimidation can do some of the same work as an organized mob. Second, the administration’s use of ICE against political speech and protest is a clear effort to turn a federal agency into a political police force.

Suspending elections or using violence, particularly assisted by paramilitaries or mobs, to disrupt elections. I don’t really see elections being in serious danger—at least, at first.

Well, we’ll see tonight, I guess, but I really don’t see the attempts to subvert the midterms being successful or even significant. I predict a pretty normal election. With that being said, they are trying to do something, and their apparent inability to pull it off tells us more about the limits of their power than the limits of their ambitions.

The use of the state security apparatus on domestic political rivals. This one needs no explanation.

Confirmed, but with significant failures. Comey and James are the obvious examples, but this goes well beyond Trump settling personal scores. The NSPM-7 memorandum gives the hunt for domestic enemies a bureaucratic framework, complete with investigations into political organizations and their supposed paymasters. The Justice Department placed the prosecution of 15 people associated with Direct Action Minnesota under this umbrella. Officials also called the Prairieland terrorism convictions an opening victory in their war on “antifa.” Prosecuting someone for shooting a police officer is one thing; treating the incident as a warrant to go hunting the left and its “funding networks” is another.

The use of federal troops and officers for mass deportations; the creation of a system of detention camps for the same purpose.

Yes, but again with some big failures and retreats along the way. Federal officers, military deportation flights, detention camps on military bases: all of these have happened. Add the wanton cruelty of third-country deportations, shipping people to countries where they have no ties, and the delivery of Venezuelans to El Salvador’s CECOT prison, where Human Rights Watch and Cristosal documented systematic torture. But the most grandiose plans have not survived contact with reality: the projected 30,000-person operation at Guantánamo was scaled back, and the much-hyped “Alligator Alcatraz” abandoned after less than a year. Surging arrests have run up against legal and logistical limits on deportations. But falling short of the administration’s ambitions is cold comfort to the people caught in the machinery.

The purging of “old regime” military officials and bureaucrats and replacement with new regime loyalists.

Confirmed, with pronounced racial, gender, and ideological dimensions. The purge of supposedly “woke” military leadership includes Joint Chiefs chairman General C. Q. Brown, who is black, and Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the first woman to lead the Navy. The campaign against “DEI” supplied an ideological rationale for removals, and civil-service applicants were asked how they would advance Trump’s policies. There are clear limits, though: a federal judge blocked that hiring question, and removing established officials does not automatically produce a reliably obedient replacement. Every vacancy, firing, or workforce reduction can’t be counted as a successful installation of an apparatchik. The purge is happening, but total institutional submission is another matter.

The use of extreme, dehumanizing rhetoric against regime opponents. Again, something already arguably fulfilled.

Confirmed. An easy one: The “enemies of the people” and “vermin” language, as well as the lie about Haitians eating pets, were already on the record when I wrote this. Trump has since called Somali-Americans and Ilhan Omar “garbage” and demanded that Omar, an American citizen and member of Congress, be thrown out of the country. This fusion of the categories of political opponent and racial enemy is definitively fascist.

A “state of emergency:” a suspension of civil liberties in the case of civil unrest or a terrorist attack. Invocation of Insurrection Act, troops on the streets of American cities. This is the “Reichstag fire” scenario. I think this would just simply prove the thesis, but not actually among my biggest fears.

Not fulfilled. Troops did appear on American streets, but the general suspension of civil liberties didn’t follow. The attempt to turn Charlie Kirk’s assassination into a pretext for a crackdown fizzled as the decisive emergency “Reichstag” moment, although it left behind NSPM-7 and the campaign against “antifa” discussed above.

The use of questionable constitutional “hardball” to ram through executive actions and circumvention of the separation of powers, i.e. proroguing Congress and doing recess appointments of cabinet members. These are sort of yellow flags: this is strongman behavior, and concerning, but sort of generally authoritarian than necessarily fascist.

Confirmed in substance, although the administration found other routes than the ones I guessed at. The freeze of congressionally appropriated funds and the efforts to keep favored prosecutors in office through disputed appointment maneuvers both qualify, I think. Congress was not prorogued, and recess appointments didn’t become the means of installing the cabinet.

An aggressive, jingoistic war to cover up a domestic failure. Trump’s supposed dovishness may come into play, but there are a lot of “neocons” in that administration already: if we intervene in Mexico to go after cartels, say, or pick a fight with Iran, I think fascism is back on the menu.

Check, but it hasn’t been in any way effective in covering up failure or rallying the public to the regime. I still think the most plausible explanation is that Trump’s failure to deliver on the domestic program encouraged a turn abroad, where the administration could demonstrate unlimited power and recover a sense of momentum. Instead, they were met with a quagmire. There’s a clear parallel with Mussolini’s attempt to reinvigorate his regime through imperial adventure, particularly the invasion of Ethiopia after the stagnation of the Depression years. Foreign conquest was used to make the feeling of national regeneration tangible. In Trump’s case, however, the supposed way out became another political failure. Womp womp.

Attacks on the rights of citizenship, in the form of abrogation of birth right citizenship and/or mass denaturalizations. This is a big one for me, as it would involve a suspension of the Constitution. Trump’s people want to cancel the 14th Amendment by executive fiat and then hope the Court ratifies this move. Big red flag.

Confirmed, but with significant resistance. Trump attempted the executive assault on birthright citizenship described above, although the Supreme Court rejected his original order—rather too closely, if you ask me. The administration has also expanded denaturalization proceedings and investigated Ilhan Omar’s citizenship after Trump demanded her expulsion. These efforts have not produced the wholesale cancellation of citizenship rights, but the nature of the attack itself is unmistakable. Again, the courts’ willingness to stop parts of it qualifies the administration’s success, but not my predictions.

“Cultural fascism:” A marked uptick in hate crimes, interpersonal sadism, the return of the casual and routine use of slurs to humiliate minorities, etc. Sort of hard to test, but more a kind of atmosphere. If this other stuff is happening, I imagine the feeling in the country will get a lot uglier.

Mixed, and probably overstated as a prediction of the national mood. There is plenty of public cruelty, racist rhetoric, and open delight in humiliation, including from the administration itself and its orbiting “influencers.” But that doesn’t establish a general transformation of everyday life or popular attitudes. Reported hate crimes actually declined in 2025, cutting against the most measurable part of this prediction. The hoped-for—or feared—“vibe shift” has not clearly materialized. The regime’s enthusiasm for sadism is evident; the country’s conversion to it is not, thank God.

Okay, so how are we doing? I think Trombly’s “failure to become fascist” is one decent way to assess these facts and takes into account the bitter disappointment of the extreme right that is now loudly defecting from MAGA. The most fascist elements of the Trumpian coalition have certainly not gotten all their wishes. But I think perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of an impotent or frustrated fascism. I must say that MAGA would most likely be a failed fascism is something I’d been positing since 2022, at least.

We have to distinguish between a fascist movement and a fascist regime. And also, to the latter, we must add three moments: fascist government—check, Stephen Miller as our Nazi “prime minister” etc.—fascist state—partial, not a total takeover of the bureaucratic structures—and fascist society, where fascist institutions and attitudes constitute the national “spirit”—not really at all. What we now possibly face is the exhaustion of the movement before the successful consolidation of the regime. One can also refer here to Robert Paxton’s Five Stages of Fascism: “1) the initial creation of fascist movements; (2) their rooting as parties in a political system; (3) the acquisition of power; (4) the exercise of power; and, finally, in the longer term, (5) radicalization or entropy.” It seems today that a failure in stage 4 has resulted in entropy rather than radicalization in stage 5.

That doesn’t mean an end to all dangers, but it does change their character. For the next two years, we’re most likely going to be fighting an isolated core that still has the levers of government but has no mass support. They still retain enormous powers to punish. They will still likely turn abroad again as their domestic powers are curbed. Like a cornered animal, they will become desperate and lash out wildly. But I believe American democracy, although badly battered, will survive. In the years to come, though, it will require a lot of care and attention to be brought back to full health. Otherwise, we will be back in the same situation soon, and perhaps without the luck.