Reading, Watching 09.29.24
This is a regular feature for paid subscribers wherein I write a little bit about what I’ve been reading and/or watching. Hope you enjoy!
First of all, I realized we haven’t had a mailbag post in a very long time, so if you have any questions you’d like to ask me, please respond to this email or sound off in the comments and I’ll try to answer them soon!
I also want to address my recent post on the war in Ukraine, which generated a lot of feedback and discussion in the comment section. Some readers expressed dismay that my thinking on Ukraine had changed, but I’m trying to make sure my thoughts adapt to the facts rather than make them fit my preconceived notions. I want to make clear that whatever settlement happens will have to involve Russia’s acceptance of Ukraine’s integration in some kind of Western security arrangement, either NATO or bilateral guarantees and, at the very least, ongoing armament and training by the West. I think those who say Russia would use a ceasefire or even peace treaty as a mere pause to undertake a later war of aggression in Ukraine are voicing a rational fear. And I have never opposed providing Ukraine with arms. But I do have to say I’ve heard a lot of quite pedantic armchair analyses about the unsustainable rate of Russian losses and Ukraine just being one more Western weapon away from victory and so forth since the failed 2023 counter-offensive. The more pessimistic analyses have proven more accurate, just as before the people who said Ukraine would lose easily and quickly were proven wrong.
I just want to reiterate the basic facts that I presented, which none of my critics really dispute: Ukraine is losing territory in the East, Ukraine is having trouble mobilizing troops, and US intel has assessed that long-range strikes within Russian territory would be risky and possibly fruitless. Now, of course, you can dispute what the intelligence community is saying by claiming biases of all sorts, but not that they are saying it. I, for one, trusted what they said about Russia’s intentions in the days before the invasion, which many doubted, bringing up the debacle of Iraq and W.M.Ds. Why should I just ignore what they are saying now? I think they’ve earned some credibility.
In Friday’s Financial Times, there was yet another article about Ukraine’s difficulties with force generation:
Senior Ukrainian officials said a recent mobilisation drive had allowed Ukraine to draft about 30,000 soldiers a month since May, when a new conscription law came into force. That is on par with the number of troops Russia has been able to recruit by offering large bonuses and generous salaries.
But commanders on the ground and military analysts have warned that the newly drafted troops are not highly motivated, are psychologically and physically unprepared — and are being killed at an alarming rate as a result.
One commander, whose unit is defending positions around Kurakhove, where Russian forces have made gains in recent weeks, said that “some guys freeze [because] they are too afraid to shoot the enemy, and then they are the ones who leave in body bags or severely wounded”.
After difficult combat stints, many new conscripts go Awol, commanders said. Some return so shell-shocked and exhausted that they are checked into psychiatric wards.
Some readers complained that my analysis had been colored by my reliance on Western media that is not getting the full picture and that I should instead look to Ukrainian sources or Russian alternative media. But I do read Ukrainian and Russian sources. One reason I chose to write this piece is because an account that I trust belonging to a former Ukrainian intel officer made quite a frank statement on the grim state of the war:
Some of the criticism I received seemed fair and well informed to me, some less so. Readers should keep in mind I was not sharing Ragozin or the War on the Rocks piece to recommend the accuracy of their analysis, but to take the temperature of the discourse surrounding the war. I’m going to share one comment that I thought was very interesting.
Reader Alex Tippet writes:
Hi John,
Long-time listener, first time caller. I just wanted to comment on your recent Ukraine piece. While the piece is very thoughtful, I think you're wrong to suggest Ukraine intends to use long-range strike capabilities to attack Russian economic or civilian infrastructure. If there's an analogy to be made, it's to Germany's hunt for "Wunderwaffen"--not to Allied strategic bombing or Vietnam.
I think it's reasonably clear that Ukraine's primary motivation for securing Western long-range weapons is to attack Russian air bases and military logistics. This is hinted at in the Times piece you link and discussed more explicitly elsewhere, like in this BBC piece: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0rwkk9r51jo
In recent months, the Russians have used long-range air-launched weapons to great effect, most famously the so-called "glide bombs." The Ukrainians have struggled to respond to these threats. These weapons are launched too far from the front for air defense systems (already stretched thin) to be very effective. Efforts to attack distant airfields with home-grown Ukrainian weapons have seen mixed results. The Ukrainians seem to believe that Western long-range strike capabilities might be more effective in attacking these airfields and deterring Russian use of these weapons. This has been stated explicitly as the motivation for long-range strike when Ukrainians have spoken to the Western press.
The Ukrainians also seem to believe these weapons would allow them to strike Russian logistics capabilities currently safe in the Russian rear. Again, they are trying to use homegrown munitions to strike these areas. They have seen some successes--they recently were able to destroy a number of Russian ammunition dumps--but they seem to believe Western weapons will be more effective here.
My guess is that they are hoping to replicate the successes seen when the HIMARs system was first deployed to Ukraine -- HIMARs, by extending the range of Ukrainian capabilities, allowed Ukraine to aggressively target Russia's logistics and command assets, inflicting substantial damage until the Russians adapted.
I am not aware of any evidence suggesting Ukrainians intended to use Western weapons against Russian economic infrastructure. Ukrainians have attacked some Russian oil depots and the pipeline but, for the most part, they've refrained from engaging in the kind of strategic strike campaign you've described.
Western weapons would not enable them to engage in such a strike campaign. There are just not enough weapons. There were, for instance, just ~4,000 ATCAMs--the U.S. missile that would be used in these strikes-- originally produced. There are more French/UK SCALP/Storm Shadow weapons but there simply aren't enough for the kind of strategic campaign you're describing.
In short, Ukraine seems focused on generating battlefield effects, not strategic ones. This is not a case of them trying to replicate Vietnam or the Allied bombing campaign.
The question, however, is if Western weapons would actually be able to generate meaningful battlefield effects. Western intelligence, as the Times article points out, is skeptical that long-range strike would have a long-term impact on Russian air capabilities. And there is a reasonable expectation that the Russian logistics infrastructure will eventually adapt to whatever pressure these weapons can bring to bear.
Fundamentally, there's not really a convincing case that these weapons will be game changers. But Ukrainian leadership, up against the wall, has convinced itself that access to these advanced weapons will allow it to push back a larger and steadily advancing foe. Wunderwaffen.
Yes, I think my assessment that these weapons are intended to wage a strategic campaign against Russia’s interior was wrong and I think this is right. I hinted at this analogy when I said “Wonder Weapons.” Now, before you get upset, that implies no political and moral comparison between Ukraine and Nazi Germany, just as bringing up Vietnam was not to suggest that Ukraine is politically equivalent to South Vietnam or not fighting an anti-imperialist war.