Ukraine is Losing the War

What It Means and What to Do Next

The world’s eyes, for understandable reasons, are fixed on the U.S. election and the terrifying development of events in the Middle East, which seem to threaten not only world peace but also what remains of the entire intellectual and moral foundation of the post-War order. But, in its own, way so does the war in Ukraine, which has receded from the center of public consciousness. Two and a half years from Russia’s invasion, Ukraine today is facing an increasingly dire situation. In the east of the country, costly Russian offensives are making steady gains. Russian strikes have also badly damaged Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, making for a long, hard winter for Ukrainian civilians already weary of the war. Ukraine is also having trouble mobilizing more young men to fight: many are going into exile or hiding to avoid the war. In a recent interview with the New Yorker, President Volodymyr Zelensky basically admitted that the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory near Kursk was an almost desperate gambit, without a long-term strategic concept, in the face of a relentless onslaught:

…it was clear to us that Russia is pressing us in the east. No matter how the Kursk operation ends, military analysts will someday calculate the speed of Russia’s progress and ask, What prevented us from stopping them earlier? How fast were they moving in the east before the Kursk operation began, and why? Ukraine had trouble mobilizing people, they might say, and didn’t have enough strength to stop them, but that is diverting the focus from the more pertinent point—namely, the fact that we should receive what we’ve been promised. I say, first give it to us, and then analyze if the root of the problem is with Ukraine or with you.

Imagine: you’re struggling in a tough war, you’re not receiving aid, you strain to maintain morale. And the Russians have the initiative in the east, they have taken parts of the Kharkiv region, and they’re about to attack Sumy. You have to do something—something other than endlessly asking your partners for help. So what do you do? Do you tell your people, “Dear Ukrainians, in two weeks, eastern Ukraine will cease to exist”? Sure, you can do that, throw up your hands, but you can also try taking a bold step.

Of course, you’re right to wonder if this action will go down in history as a success or a failure. It’s too early to judge. But I am not preoccupied with historic successes. I’m focussed on the here and now. What we can say, however, is that it has already shown some results. It has slowed down the Russians and forced them to move some of their forces to Kursk, on the order of forty thousand troops. Already, our fighters in the east say that they are being battered less frequently.

Part of Zelensky’s “plan for victory” is to lobby its Western allies for strikes deep within Russian territory using long range weapons, presumably to attack Russia’s economic infrastructure and win a more favorable negotiating position. But strategic strikes alone have never won a war: neither the Allies truly earthshaking round-the-clock bombing campaign against Germany nor the U.S.’s on North Vietnam enough to secure victory in either conflict. Even in the era of drones and electronic warfare, there are no “wonder weapons.” Ultimately, troops just have to win battles and take territory. This morning’s New York Times reports that the intelligence community is wary of authorizing such moves, pointing to high risks and questionable rewards. The West’s strategic warfare against Russia in the form of sanctions has not successfully crippled the Russian economy: it’s humming along, perhaps even “overheating” a bit, with the tried and true formula of war production. If far-reaching sanctions couldn’t do it, it seems unlikely that a few cruise missile hits will either. Any sort of concerted effort to physically destroy Russia’s infrastructure risks provoking an aggressive Russian response that could lead to all-out war with NATO, a nightmare scenario.

With less men and materiel than Russia, Ukraine’s options are limited. It seems highly likely that they will have to sacrifice territory in any prospective negotiation. According to Leonid Ragozin’s somewhat cynical analysis in BNE Intellinews is that the “victory plan” is essentially designed to be refused in order allow political room for maneuver for Zelensky:

The country’s former prosecutor-general Yury Lutsenko outlined what might be Zelenskiy’s real Plan B. One of the leading figures of the 2014 Maidan Revolution, Lutsenko is Zelenskiy’s opponent, criticising him from “patriotic”, that is jingoistic, positions.

In a Facebook post later circulated by Ukrainian media, he alleged that upon receiving a flat no from Biden, Zelenskiy could loudly announce that Ukraine had been betrayed by its allies and enter peace negotiations with the Russians.

The Kremlin, Lutsenko maintains, will slap on him conditions along the lines of the failed Istanbul deal, which Ukraine seriously pondered but eventually rejected in the spring of 2022. A number of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian sources (including, lately, former US State Under-Secretary Victoria Nuland) suggested that it happened because Western governments were unhappy with the deal which envisaged Ukraine’s neutral status and a very modest-sized army, among other things. They also presumed that some Ukrainian territory would remain under Russian control, but a much smaller chunk compared to what Russian controls now and which it is very unlikely to give away.

Zelenskiy, Lutsenko speculates, will agree to a ceasefire and put it to a referendum. He will simultaneously get himself re-elected in his new re-incarnation as “the president of peace”.

If Ukraine accepts the loss of territory currently controlled by Russia (more will be lost before negotiations begin in earnest) as well as neutral status and demilitarisation, then the questions Ukrainians will be asking their government will be as follows: What was this enormous sacrifice for if we could have had a much better deal with Russia in Istanbul, not to mention Minsk agreements (which were ditched by Zelenskiy prior to the start of Russia’s full-out invasion)?

The simple answer that could potentially ensure Zelenskiy’s political survival in post-war years goes along the lines of Skriabin’s song – “we’ve been duped, we’ve been cheated like suckers” – by the West. If he decides to go in that direction, then we are likely to hear about the circumstances of Ukraine rejecting the Istanbul deal from the horse’s mouth. Various sources, including a senior Ukrainian negotiator, suggested it was British prime minister Boris Johnson derailing the agreement with tacit support from Washington.

That might seem too clever by half and almost conspiratorial in its logic: too certain of fixed trajectories in a highly fluid and contingent situation. But it’s not necessarily less convincing than the discourse produced on the other side of Ukraine war debate, say for instance on the generally very good and informative blog War on the Rocks, which uses history to speculate about a potential “Russian breaking point:”

So where does this all lead? While history is not necessarily predictive, at least the cases of Afghanistan and Chechnya (in 1994) suggest that Russia’s biggest vulnerability may lie at the intersection between battlefield casualties and economic strain.

Russian leaders appear to be aware of this worrisome problem in Ukraine. Generals are doing their best to hide casualties and keep wounded and distraught soldiers from returning home where, like the Afghansky of the 1980s, they might undermine popular support. They are desperately trying to use mercenaries, convicts, foreign troops, and unempowered mobilized troops to soak up casualties in order to keep their contract army intact. But Russia may be running out of cannon fodder. Military personnel costs are skyrocketing. Meanwhile, Putin is doing his best to maintain a veneer of economic normality. But his economy is almost certainly suffering under Western sanctions and market isolation.

Therefore, despite all the historico-cultural factors mitigating toward Russian endurance in this war, practical realities seem likely to intrude. Russia’s efforts to caulk over its vulnerabilities may be successful in the short run, perhaps through the beginning of 2025. But there is good reason to expect that the combined Ukrainian and Western strategy focused on pressuring Russia through battlefield losses and economic compression will succeed.

War is, of course, a two-sided contest of opposing wills, and there is always the uncomfortable possibility of the West losing its will first. Understanding why Russia is still fighting, and when its will might break, can help articulate a compelling theory of victory for Ukraine and, in doing so, help sustain the West’s own commitment.

If this business about demonstrating resolve and “commitment” sounds fishy to you it’s because it was part of the same Cold War thinking that got us increasingly entangled in Vietnam. And with all due respect to the author, this sounds a little like “cope” as they say online.

The best case scenario that I can see, far short of victory according to some on the Ukrainian side, is that Zelensky’s plan includes a way to give Russia another bloody nose, making peace negotiations somewhat more favorable to the Ukrainian side and making the sacrifices of this terrible war bearable for the Ukrainian people. Withstanding the Russian invasion in the first place was a heroic feat that rightly earned the world’s admiration: it’s already a great victory in its own right. It would be a tragedy indeed to see that accomplishment squandered by either a lack of hope or a lack of realism.