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JerL's avatar

Great stuff, this series is what I love about your writing most of all: you can take a topic I would have told you I don't care about at all, and write something so clear, eloquent, and thought provoking it makes me unable to even remember how I could have found this uninteresting.

The only thing you do better is when you write about something I already know I care about (e.g. occultism in Silicon Valley).

Enjoy your holidays, hope 2024 is a great year for you (and all fellow Unpopular Frontists), and thanks for filling my 2023 with lots of interesting, thoughtful writing.

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Devin Fitzpatrick's avatar

Exceptional work. The incel example in the context of comparing Girard and Marx is insightfully chosen and explained. I appreciate your charitable (it seems to me) emphasis on Girard's ambivalence between Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment reaction and how the novelists he interprets may share that ambivalence. Your discussion of the commodity fetish evokes for me one more framework that might be useful in interpreting narratives of decadence: the value of purity.

In their 2014 paper "Against the Yuck Factor," Kelly and Morar conclude that the emotion of disgust is an especially unreliable moral indicator because it extends one's reaction to poisons and pathogens toward socially contingent "foreign elements," so to speak. Disgust is a fast-acting rejection response to literally or figuratively "spit something out" before pollution can occur. But when someone is culturally conditioned to find an target disgusting, they experience that disgust just the same way, just as immediately and overwhelmingly, as they would when smelling or tasting something toxic-seeming. In the grip of disgust and its sense of emergency, every disgusting object seems intrinsically dangerous and everything threatened by that object seems intrinsically valuable. In disgust's immediacy, there is no consciousness of mediation -- there's just you and the threat -- or much capacity to introduce it through, say, reflection on what constitutes danger and why.

As the moral emotion of anger is bound up with the value of fairness and contempt is bound up with authority or hierarchy, so the moral emotion of disgust is bound up with purity: there is a sacred that must be protected from the profane with an urgency that supersedes logical or empirical justification. For disgust, the body is a temple. It's not hard to imagine how an emotion like disgust might evolve to help us survive as a species, in its sheer practicality and even in its hostile and regulative social dimension. Sometimes disgust is right to make us spit. It is just not reliably right and, more importantly, arguably reliably wrong (maybe differing from anger or contempt here) as soon as we start talking about people and not, like, literal excrement.

I don't know how helpful armchair psychology of reactionaries is, especially compared to focusing on their ideologies or material interests, but: there is a throughline of purity here that connects a desire for direct unmediated access, reification of what is contextual into an intrinsic property, and an anxiety over decadent decay. There never was such a thing as artistic pursuit without material concerns, a noble aristocracy without brutish domination, a salon without pettiness, a mind without a body, the sacred without the profane. But disgust and its attendant value of purity can make it seem so. In theory, corruption could be understood in terms of harm done or injustice suffered, and we could discuss concretely in terms of harms and injustices what enables or inhibits intellectual and aesthetic authenticity and originality. But in practice, the value of purity forms an entirely separate interpretive framework that resists reduction and appears ineffable: some things are just sacred and others just profane.

There seem to me two crucial moves for the reasonably ambivalent individual to make here: first, to affirm that compassion and fairness are higher values than purity and authority, that the latter must serve and be understood in terms of their contribution to the former; and second, to acknowledge that even the value of the higher values must still be interpreted, that mediation (or Thirdness) remains between us and even what is most obviously true or good. We do not transcend mediation, but find and create kinder and fairer modes of mediation, what Dewey calls "amelioration." Dewey argues that there are no ends in themselves, just "ends in view": purposes or values that we take to be good enough for going on in the moment but which are always provisional and open to question. What is authentic or "pure" is, at best, just so in relation to its context and the other values it realizes, which will change. We should be sympathetic to the alienated and any yearning for intrinsic and irreducible value. But we must have the courage to move on, again and again, to the next, provisionally more valuable, end in view. Ultimately, I can only conclude that the politics of despair, whatever else it involves, represents the lack of this courage.

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