This is very insightful. I would argue that some of the most influential ideological warlords are figures far below the level of Koch or Soros though: the YouTube personalities, the professional Twitter activists and many others whose livelihood or social status/role is tied up in their ability to maintain an energized and outraged constituency are a far better fit for the term. Their power isn't the result of external financial resources but is directly related to their ability to maintain a constant sense of mobilization. This results in a much less ideologically coherent structure for mass politics, as it's motivated less by ideology or even mass interest and more by parasocial relationships with a band of followers.
I like this comparison a lot. It reminds of C. Thi Nguyen's writing about how online echo chambers are like cults in the way they involve and require manipulating people's trust. Seems to me that various online grifters are practising their own kind of ideological warlordism in the following way: the collapse of post-politics and the resulting legitimacy crisis for political institutions have created fertile terrain for people to gain followers. Would-be warlords then start randomly exploring the terrain mixing and matching different ideas according to what gets them followers. Social media helps immensely because it gives immediate feedback. So a health blogger realizes he gets tonnes of traffic when he writes about vaccines. Maybe one of his commenters mentions some conspiracy, he looks into that, writes about it, gets more follows and likes and responds to that feedback.
Since the whole process plays out randomly (based on where a would-be warlord starts and what resonates with their audience) these constituencies develop organically and also incoherently. And none of this requires any vision or planning. All that you need to get the process going is a person who wants lots of followers.
Seems like this process in turn shapes the constituencies that people like the Kochs have to appeal to. "The people" have gotten more incoherent because of small-time warlords and as a result, the would-be big time ideological warlords have to be more incoherent themselves and have a harder time establishing hegemonic control.
Now that I've written this comment, this whole thing seems obvious and banal. Anyway, your post generated some new thoughts for me (even if they are mundane and probably wrong). Thanks
I would draw a distinction between the notional warlords operating by funding candidates and institutions, for example Soros, the DeVoses, and the Kochs, and by contrast those operating largely on the basis of their own immediate appeal (Trump, Rogan, Bongino, Sanders). There is, of course, great potential for overlap, most notably where Mr Trump, the most notable warlord of the second type, has amassed funds allowing him to offer assistance to friendly candidates, but I still see the first sort as having a much greater stake in the continued existence of stable institutions and political processes than the second.
On reflexion, though, noöne willing to destroy has ever been shy about using existing institutions—'What else do I have?'*—in the service of their ultimate destruction. Still, not everyone is that sanguinary or that sanguine, and I'll still bet that most people trying to get power democratically, or at least via elections, have some sort of mediating affection for such. (Hitler at times wanted to destroy the Wehrmacht completely, but never did because he had a reserve of love for the institution that had awed and rescued him.) (One bad side-effect of Love Worship [see: 'the Summer of'] is that people forget that monsters can love and Love be monstrous.)
*for which I guess I must have a certain sympathy, as a communist anarchist who's looking for work and who votes as a Democrat. (Do judge me! just remember whom you ought to judge much harder.)
It would seem that an important aspect of some of these particular fiefdoms is a quite intense sense of identification between follower and warlord, where it becomes less about whatever interests are held in common (or how following a particular lord will materially or socially benefit the follower) than a sense of satisfaction and even pleasure in watching the figurehead succeed, even if they (mostly hes) don't bring any of their followers along with them.
Something to note, I think, between Rogan and Young: Rogan’s power comes only from himself: He built his podcast, and he’s been on the receiving end of accusations of heresy well before he took $100M from Spotify (e.g., the reaction to his endorsement of Bernie). Young, on the other hand, is speaking on behalf of a political structure (an opposing Ideological Fiefdom, if I can mix histories) with its own power centers (numerous foundations and their supporters in the press).
So while its easiest to identify wealthy backers, some of these territories are held in a more anarchic way where social media has provided the signal mechanism it didn’t have in earlier eras. This, as you imply, means that organizing is both easier and more brittle than before.
I came here to make the comparison to Rao's "knights" and "mooks" as well - I think it is the Extremely Online, social media component of this broader pattern Ganz is observing. Rush or Bill O'Reilly were ideological warlords of this type (with a legion of disgruntled followers like my grandfather), but they never mobilized them directly the way we've seen from even the smaller players in the Trump-feudal right (thinking of all the nobodies urging their fans towards the Capitol riot last year).
The concept is interesting, but I’m not convinced by the notion that the current warlords are ideologically incoherent or that they lack at least the real potential for hegemonic status. The coherence is provided by some variation of the shared idea that the liberal/social welfare state - in whatever form - is illegitimate, and the hegemonic potential lies in the fact that the 21st century Republican Party is their access mechanism into the political and justice system. Without the latter element the thing wouldn’t work, but the warlords have that now.
Soros is not left, he is as neoliberal as any of the rest of them and all for the rule of the few. What we have is the "progressives" (right-wing economically, progressive socially) and the conservatives (right wing economically, right wing socially [at least publicly when it suits them]) dancing on the grave of working class political power. There is also a very stable agreement on foreign policy, with the only difference over how hard to shout propaganda against Russia, Iran and China. Stop watching the kabuki play and start assessing what the oligarchs are happily all doing together to increase their power. Identity politics is just another version of divide and conquer.
This is very insightful. I would argue that some of the most influential ideological warlords are figures far below the level of Koch or Soros though: the YouTube personalities, the professional Twitter activists and many others whose livelihood or social status/role is tied up in their ability to maintain an energized and outraged constituency are a far better fit for the term. Their power isn't the result of external financial resources but is directly related to their ability to maintain a constant sense of mobilization. This results in a much less ideologically coherent structure for mass politics, as it's motivated less by ideology or even mass interest and more by parasocial relationships with a band of followers.
I like this comparison a lot. It reminds of C. Thi Nguyen's writing about how online echo chambers are like cults in the way they involve and require manipulating people's trust. Seems to me that various online grifters are practising their own kind of ideological warlordism in the following way: the collapse of post-politics and the resulting legitimacy crisis for political institutions have created fertile terrain for people to gain followers. Would-be warlords then start randomly exploring the terrain mixing and matching different ideas according to what gets them followers. Social media helps immensely because it gives immediate feedback. So a health blogger realizes he gets tonnes of traffic when he writes about vaccines. Maybe one of his commenters mentions some conspiracy, he looks into that, writes about it, gets more follows and likes and responds to that feedback.
Since the whole process plays out randomly (based on where a would-be warlord starts and what resonates with their audience) these constituencies develop organically and also incoherently. And none of this requires any vision or planning. All that you need to get the process going is a person who wants lots of followers.
Seems like this process in turn shapes the constituencies that people like the Kochs have to appeal to. "The people" have gotten more incoherent because of small-time warlords and as a result, the would-be big time ideological warlords have to be more incoherent themselves and have a harder time establishing hegemonic control.
Now that I've written this comment, this whole thing seems obvious and banal. Anyway, your post generated some new thoughts for me (even if they are mundane and probably wrong). Thanks
This is really on target, I think, especially the second to last paragraph.
I would draw a distinction between the notional warlords operating by funding candidates and institutions, for example Soros, the DeVoses, and the Kochs, and by contrast those operating largely on the basis of their own immediate appeal (Trump, Rogan, Bongino, Sanders). There is, of course, great potential for overlap, most notably where Mr Trump, the most notable warlord of the second type, has amassed funds allowing him to offer assistance to friendly candidates, but I still see the first sort as having a much greater stake in the continued existence of stable institutions and political processes than the second.
On reflexion, though, noöne willing to destroy has ever been shy about using existing institutions—'What else do I have?'*—in the service of their ultimate destruction. Still, not everyone is that sanguinary or that sanguine, and I'll still bet that most people trying to get power democratically, or at least via elections, have some sort of mediating affection for such. (Hitler at times wanted to destroy the Wehrmacht completely, but never did because he had a reserve of love for the institution that had awed and rescued him.) (One bad side-effect of Love Worship [see: 'the Summer of'] is that people forget that monsters can love and Love be monstrous.)
*for which I guess I must have a certain sympathy, as a communist anarchist who's looking for work and who votes as a Democrat. (Do judge me! just remember whom you ought to judge much harder.)
It would seem that an important aspect of some of these particular fiefdoms is a quite intense sense of identification between follower and warlord, where it becomes less about whatever interests are held in common (or how following a particular lord will materially or socially benefit the follower) than a sense of satisfaction and even pleasure in watching the figurehead succeed, even if they (mostly hes) don't bring any of their followers along with them.
Makes me think of this:
https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2020/01/16/the-internet-of-beefs/
Something to note, I think, between Rogan and Young: Rogan’s power comes only from himself: He built his podcast, and he’s been on the receiving end of accusations of heresy well before he took $100M from Spotify (e.g., the reaction to his endorsement of Bernie). Young, on the other hand, is speaking on behalf of a political structure (an opposing Ideological Fiefdom, if I can mix histories) with its own power centers (numerous foundations and their supporters in the press).
So while its easiest to identify wealthy backers, some of these territories are held in a more anarchic way where social media has provided the signal mechanism it didn’t have in earlier eras. This, as you imply, means that organizing is both easier and more brittle than before.
I came here to make the comparison to Rao's "knights" and "mooks" as well - I think it is the Extremely Online, social media component of this broader pattern Ganz is observing. Rush or Bill O'Reilly were ideological warlords of this type (with a legion of disgruntled followers like my grandfather), but they never mobilized them directly the way we've seen from even the smaller players in the Trump-feudal right (thinking of all the nobodies urging their fans towards the Capitol riot last year).
The concept is interesting, but I’m not convinced by the notion that the current warlords are ideologically incoherent or that they lack at least the real potential for hegemonic status. The coherence is provided by some variation of the shared idea that the liberal/social welfare state - in whatever form - is illegitimate, and the hegemonic potential lies in the fact that the 21st century Republican Party is their access mechanism into the political and justice system. Without the latter element the thing wouldn’t work, but the warlords have that now.
I didn't say they were ideologically incoherent
The warlords of the Chinese Warlord Era were ideologically incoherent
mea culpa. I thought your reference to it was also meant to apply to the current situation.
Soros is not left, he is as neoliberal as any of the rest of them and all for the rule of the few. What we have is the "progressives" (right-wing economically, progressive socially) and the conservatives (right wing economically, right wing socially [at least publicly when it suits them]) dancing on the grave of working class political power. There is also a very stable agreement on foreign policy, with the only difference over how hard to shout propaganda against Russia, Iran and China. Stop watching the kabuki play and start assessing what the oligarchs are happily all doing together to increase their power. Identity politics is just another version of divide and conquer.