A couple of thoughts I felt were worth sharing about your article:
1. On war termination
You say “ultimately, troops just have to win battles and take territory” for Ukraine to win. We’ve both lived through two conflicts, one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan, where the US won, by conventional terms, resounding battlefield victories and secured the terrain, only to end in something other than the clear cut victory you suggest these two factors lead to. Instead, it should clue us in to a different understanding of how wars end: when both sides agree that one is the victor and the other is the vanquished. Consider the Taliban, who simply refused to concede that defeat was the product of loss of terrain or personnel against a foe with superior numbers (at least in terms of population within coalition nations) and more sophisticated weaponry. There is a case to be made that if one side fights on then the war simply isn’t over. Despite how military buffs like to imagine it, neither seizing and holding terrain nor defeating enemy forces on the battlefield inevitably results in victory and defeat. There is an intermediate step where political leadership has to decide who won and who lost.
2. The role of technology in war
I agree with you that “strategic strikes alone have never won a war.” (Historian Mark Clodfelter makes a convincing case that the physical destruction of targets by air has never directly resulted in defeat. If you haven’t read any of his work, I strongly recommend Beneficial Bombing as a starting point). But comparing long range precision munitions to the US strategic bombing campaigns in WWII or Vietnam is comparing two dissimilar things. Consider the much-discussed ATACMS: ATACMS is a ground-fired precision weapon and cannot be used for mass aerial bombardment. Getting out of the way that it isn’t a fleet of bombers, this confuses tactical or operational effects with strategic ones. I don’t know who is suggesting to you that ATACMS or other long range munitions are strategic weapons, but they aren’t. The idea is that Ukraine could employ ATACMS (and other long range precision munitions) to disrupt Russian logistics, including those inside Russia, giving advantage to Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. I agree that there are no wonder weapons, but that doesn’t mean technology is irrelevant. You state that “any sort of concerted effort to physically destroy Russia’s infrastructure risks provoking an aggressive Russian response that could lead to all-out war with NATO, a nightmare scenario.” Even if Ukraine employed US munitions with long range capabilities to strike Russian infrastructure (instead of logistics as I’ve proposed) my question is: how is destroying Russian infrastructure different than killing Russian soldiers on the ground in Ukraine? In either case, US provided munitions are being used to diminish the military capability of Russia. You refer to this as if it’s a red line we cannot cross, but the Biden administration has very timidly approached and passed each supposed red line without consequence. Keep in mind who sets those red lines. In this case, Russia did. Conceding to that kind of blackmail only demonstrates its effectiveness.
3. Manpower and technology
You say that “with less men and materiel than Russia, Ukraine’s options are limited.” If you haven’t read Stephen Biddle’s Military Power, I strongly encourage you to do so and to grapple with his argument. He makes the case that neither manpower nor technology determine battlefield outcomes. It’s a sometimes strange read given his quantitative approach, but its analysis is one I’ve returned to again and again. Please read it if you haven’t.
4. Beware flawed historical analogies
“If this business about demonstrating resolve and “commitment” sounds fishy to you it’s because it was part of the same Cold War thinking that got us increasingly entangled in Vietnam.”
Again, I think the comparison is off here. If I was accusing you of being deliberately nefarious I would say it’s a sleight of hand, but I tend to think it’s just a misunderstanding. Comparing the US backing of France and later South Vietnam against an anti-colonial insurgency is not the same as backing a democratic nation battling an invasion by an authoritarian regime. US intervention in Korea and Vietnam was predicated on a false belief in the domino theory. No one is alleging a global communist conspiracy in this case (at least not that I’m aware of). Instead of a conspiracy, this is an aggressor nation seeking to reestablish an empire. Russia is waging an imperial war, not an anti-colonial one. If you want to make a historical analogy, why the US in Vietnam instead of the Soviets in Afghanistan?
5. Postwar realism
Finally, you suggest that Ukraine needs to be realistic about its prospects for victory. We also need to be realistic about what victory looks like to Russia. Russia has a say in any negotiations (although we often talk as if this issue rests solely with Ukraine), and we have to ask what Russia’s goals are, and if any peace (which Russia has shown they will willingly violate) can be secured in the long term even with concessions. If Russia’s goals remain unchanged, peace can provide a time to better prepare for the next war. (Yes, I realize I’m leaving myself open to criticism I’m making a Munich analogy)
I hope you don’t dismiss this as “cope.” I liked When the Clock Broke and a lot of your other work, but I think there are enough flaws here that it warrants discussion. My comments are far from implying that “if the US just gave Ukraine ATACMS, then Ukraine would win.” I don’t see victory as inevitable regardless of the lethal aid the US provides - but I don’t see defeat as inevitable unless the US and other nations withdraw their support.
I brought up Biddle because if we’re talking about the role of manpower and material, then we’re talking about factors that are believed to profoundly influence or determine battlefield outcomes. His analysis is different, which can shift the way material and manpower strengths are discussed.
Two points regarding the concept of the war as one of attrition. We talk about “wars of attrition” as if they’re a condition that is irreversible. History shows multiple wars that, at one point, could be described as wars of attrition, but later saw armies maneuver. Consider the kaiserschlacht and the Meuse-Argonne offensive of 1918.
Second, this ignores the naval war, where Ukraine has been remarkably successful. Forcing the relocation of the Black Sea Fleet is not a negligible accomplishment, but one that gets ignored in discussions of the war as a statement or a war of attrition.
Final thought: if the Russians are favored materially, as you suggest, why are they turning to North Korea and Iran for munitions? This behavior suggests any material advantage they are presumed to possess it isn’t that clear cut.
Very interesting and knowledgeable. Would you be willing to give a short precis of Biddle's argument? I'm especially curious about what he might say about comparative resource levels in the broad sense (not only manpower, but finance, materials, etc.) and war outcomes ("battlefield outcomes" and "war outcomes" being not necessarily the same thing).
Biddle argues that since 1918 the defining factor in determining the outcome of battle in mid to high intensity conflicts has remained constant. He concludes that force employment, the modern system by which forces are used operationally and tactically employed in combat, determines that outcome. This contrasts sharply with other scholars who point towards technology or numerical superiority. Biddle recognizes these factors, arguing that technology amplifies the effects of force employment, but that neither can overcome it.
Biddle first uses three historical case studies to examine his thesis of force employment’s prominence. Biddle examines the second battle of the Somme in 1918, Operation Goodwood, the Allied attempt to break out of Normandy in 1944, and Desert Storm. These constitute a small-n analysis, which Biddle pairs with a large-n statistical analysis and simulation modeling.
His analysis is focused solely on ground combat and he does not discuss larger issues of mobilization or morale.
As you seem to suggest in your last sentence, it sounds like Biddle is distinctly focused on battle outcomes, not whole wars. This makes him sound somewhat specialized and, with respect, perhaps beside the larger point in reference to Ukraine. While battles are important, it seems to me that the outcome of a whole war, especially in modern conditions, is often not simply a sum of the battles fought in it. With reference to Ukraine specifically, I might *tentatively* suggest that, while a series of spectacular battlefield victories in the first year or so might have won the war by altering political conditions in Russia, at this point, the prospect of a battlefield victory on Ukraine's part that would actually cause Russia to regard itself as defeated *in the war as a whole* seems somewhat unlikely. To me, this now looks like a war of attrition, and the material fundamentals seem to favor Russia (again, not in any one battle, but in the whole war) absent unlikely massive political changes in the US and/or its European allies toward much, much more energetic, self-sacrificing support.
Assuming that Putin is interested in the kind of deal here proposed, then the result will be a severely weakened Ukraine with, at best, guarantees from the West and Russia like the previous guarantees that were abandoned. Putin's explicit goal, the end of Ukraine as a nation, whether through another and better prepared invasion or by other means, will then obviously be only a matter of time. So the real question is, are the Ukrainians so beaten that they are willing for their children to be Russians?
What about the Minsk Agreement? Guarantees all round when Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal. Including from Russia, whose guarantees were clearly not worth the paper they were written on. It's existential for Ukraine, because Putin doesn't believe Ukraine even has a right to exist and indeed should only be a province of Russia without even its own language or culture. Russia has shown Ukrainians that there is no acceptable future for them under the Russian jackboot.Take your argument forward to after Ukraine's capitulation and you would have to allow Moldova, Georgia etc just to fold in front of Russian intransigence. And then why not Poland and the Baltics? Ukraine has done pretty well so far in the face of dithering by Biden and outright obstruction by Putin-friendly Republicans. Don't blame the Ukrainians for their battlefield difficulties. Moreover, if you look at what they are doing to the Russian economy with their own new generation of drones, you might not want to write them off too soon.
The idea of new US security commitments in Europe seems questionable in the current US political context. Even if, for example, the Dems won both the WH and one or both houses of Congress, the commitments would be seen as untrustworthy, since the Republicans will eventually return and may well retain their new isolationist (at least, in regard to Europe) bent.
From the creators of "a NATO jet firing at a missile aimed at a fucking Uzhgorod will start nuclear war" comes the game-changing security arrangement of "we'll teach you how to build the hottest military technology of 1969 in a factory you won't be able to shield from Russian fire with labor that fled the country two years ago, with money you won't have (and also we'll maybe share some intelligence information with you sometimes, if we feel like it)".
I have some thoughts on this assessment. Ukraine wants long range capabilities to continue what they’ve been doing with their own *home grown* long range drones - destroying ammunition depots (3 last week, one supposedly *impenetrable, even by nukes* - per the Russians) and oil refineries/fuel storage. The invasion of Kursk was well planned and had the most exceptional opsec of anything seen in this war. The Russians are starved for ammunition (see above) and manpower - just as the Ukrainians are. Now that the war has come to Russian soil, even Russian pollsters are finding widening discontent with the war and more and more are expressing the desire to get out of the war by ceding back all the territory they’ve stolen over the last 10 years. The Russian economy is fucked. Inflation is running around 9.5% and is expected to rise next year. Their central bank just raised interest rates to 19%, which is great for Russians fighting and dying in the war since Putin keeps giving away more and more money and there’s nothing to buy and savings rates are very high. Sanctions are being skirted for some luxury goods and of course for dual purpose tech, but they’ve not been able to find suitable replacements for the goods from companies that pulled out in 2022. China doesn’t make nice stuff. (We could’ve told them that!) Yes, the Ukrainians are suffering and this winter looks like it could be very bad. Yesterday, Germany announced a package to (partially) address that. We are finally giving them more air defense systems. And TBH, just like when Biden authorized the Ukrainians getting ATACMS and not stating it publicly until they’d already successfully used them on a bunch of Russian kit, I wouldn’t be surprised if the same happens for the authorization of using them on Russian territory before it gets made public.
If you spend an hour reading Russian (“dissident”) and Ukrainian media and stop reading the garbage coming out in most western outlets, you’ll get a much better understanding of what’s going on. Western media shades everything through the lens - usually partisan - of whatever *expert(s)* they’ve spoken to for the article. There are hawks and doves in every national security apparatus, just as there are those who’ve watched every red line Putin has laid down being crossed with no response beyond the usual and saying “let’s give the Ukrainians more” and those that see this and say “but the next red line might be the real one”. Basically, we can live in fear or give Ukraine what it needs to nip the Russian bear’s nose good and hard, here and now and end Putin’s ability to scare leaders into making decisions that are in the best interest of Russia and not necessarily those of the country making those decisions.
Precisely. Meduza inter alia, along with Kyiv Post, Euromaidan, Moscow Times. Too many people swallow the Moscow disinformation narratives. Admittedly it does help if you read Russian and/or Ukrainian, but it's never too late to start learning them. Even if you don't, a lot of these sources translate many of their news and analysis articles into English. Am I glad of my Slavic studies from university days!
Precisely. Meduza inter alia, along with Kyiv Post, Euromaidan, Moscow Times. Too many people swallow the Moscow disinformation narratives. Admittedly it does help if you read Russian and/or Ukrainian, but it's never too late to start learning them. Even if you don't, a lot of these sources translate many of their news and analysis articles into English. Am I glad of my Slavic studies from university days!
Precisely. Meduza inter alia, along with Kyiv Post, Euromaidan, Moscow Times. Too many people swallow the Moscow disinformation narratives. Admittedly it does help if you read Russian and/or Ukrainian, but it's never too late to start learning them. Even if you don't, a lot of these sources translate many of their news and analysis articles into English. Am I glad of my Slavic studies from university days!
I'm a fan of your writing, John, but, speaking as a Ukraine expert, this one misses the mark, I think. As I've written before, calls for "peace" overlook two crucial facts. First, any land-for-peace deal will lead not to "peace" but to mass killings, ethnic cleansing, filtration camps, arbitrary detentions, torture, etc. for the millions of Ukrainians permanently consigned to Russian occupation - which is precisely why the Ukrainian public overwhelmingly opposes it.
Second, leaving aside its undesirability, such a deal would probably be impossible to implement. So intense is opposition to the prospect in Ukraine that if Zelensky tried to sign one, he'd likely be ousted, legally or extra-legally. It would also spark a pro-Ukrainian insurgency in the east that continues the fight against Russia. So, no matter how much the West wants it, and no matter whether Ukraine's leadership tries it, a negotiated settlement just isn't going to work.
The longer the West delays this stuff, the less leverage it will have over where and how Ukraine fights. That's already happening, as the Kursk invasion shows. And it can potentially become far, far worse, as far as the West is concerned (think assassinations of Russian diplomats and business people in Western capitals, a revival of Ukraine's nuclear program, etc., etc.). The only way to maintain any leverage over Ukraine in this regard is to give it what it needs to win, and soon.
BTW, Ragozin is not really a serious person. He demonstrated this once again in the piece you reference, which is based on a fundamental misreading of Ukrainian political realities, the Minsk process, etc. It wasn't the West that stopped Ukraine from signing a deal in April 2022; the Ukrainian leadership itself chose not to sign it, largely because - as leaked documents show - Russia made last-minute changes which would have left Ukraine militarily neutered and without any possibility of Western backing in the event Russia broke the terms. He also completely distorts the Minsk process; it was not Zelensky who abandoned Minsk (an unworkable deal to begin with); Zelensky betrayed an almost precious naiveté in believing Minsk could still be salvaged only to learn otherwise once Russia continued to insist on a method of implementation that would have consigned the Donbas to permanent Russian vassalage.
The people who wanted and still want to delay heavier weapons as one kind of pretend non-escalation have a lot to answer for. If we had given them the breadth of tools we are given them now at the begining of the war, things would be different.
Long-time listener, first time caller. I just wanted to comment on your recent Ukraine piece. While the piece is very thoughtful, I think you're wrong to suggest Ukraine intends to use long-range strike capabilities to attack Russian economic or civilian infrastructure. If there's an analogy to be made, it's to Germany's hunt for "Wunderwaffen"--not to Allied strategic bombing or Vietnam.
I think it's reasonably clear that Ukraine's primary motivation for securing Western long-range weapons is to attack Russian air bases and military logistics. This is hinted at in the Times piece you link and discussed more explicitly elsewhere, like in this BBC piece: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0rwkk9r51jo
In recent months, the Russians have used long-range air-launched weapons to great effect, most famously the so-called "glide bombs." The Ukrainians have struggled to respond to these threats. These weapons are launched too far from the front for air defense systems (already stretched thin) to be very effective. Efforts to attack distant airfields with home-grown Ukrainian weapons have seen mixed results. The Ukrainians seem to believe that Western long-range strike capabilities might be more effective in attacking these airfields and deterring Russian use of these weapons. This has been stated explicitly as the motivation for long-range strike when Ukrainians have spoken to the Western press.
The Ukrainians also seem to believe these weapons would allow them to strike Russian logistics capabilities currently safe in the Russian rear. Again, they are trying to use homegrown munitions to strike these areas. They have seen some successes--they recently were able to destroy a number of Russian ammunition dumps--but they seem to believe Western weapons will be more effective here.
My guess is that they are hoping to replicate the successes seen when the HIMARs system was first deployed to Ukraine -- HIMARs, by extending the range of Ukrainian capabilities, allowed Ukraine to aggressively target Russia's logistics and command assets, inflicting substantial damage until the Russians adapted.
I am not aware of any evidence suggesting Ukrainians intended to use Western weapons against Russian economic infrastructure. Ukrainians have attacked some Russian oil depots and the pipeline but, for the most part, they've refrained from engaging in the kind of strategic strike campaign you've described.
Western weapons would not enable them to engage in such a strike campaign. There are just not enough weapons. There were, for instance, just ~4,000 ATCAMs--the U.S. missile that would be used in these strikes-- originally produced. There are more French/UK SCALP/Storm Shadow weapons but there simply aren't enough for the kind of strategic campaign you're describing.
In short, Ukraine seems focused on generating battlefield effects, not strategic ones. This is not a case of them trying to replicate Vietnam or the Allied bombing campaign.
The question, however, is if Western weapons would actually be able to generate meaningful battlefield effects. Western intelligence, as the Times article points out, is skeptical that long-range strike would have a long-term impact on Russian air capabilities. And there is a reasonable expectation that the Russian logistics infrastructure will eventually adapt to whatever pressure these weapons can bring to bear.
Fundamentally, there's not really a convincing case that these weapons will be game changers. But Ukrainian leadership, up against the wall, has convinced itself that access to these advanced weapons will allow it to push back a larger and steadily advancing foe. Wunderwaffen.
The liberal West could make Ukraine achieve robust negotiating position (if not "win") if it was willing to rattle the status quo — seriously crack down on trade with Russia or invest in its own war production. This is not about money even, which the West clearly thinks it has a shortage of, but about making military production cost close to material and countless other things. Actions that would involve cutting off money spigots to various interest groups, in MIC and civilian conglomerates dealing in Russia both. This sounds conspiratorial, but it is not really, for example, why would VP of Russia in PepsiCo voluntarily agree to his department's closure? Because Ukraine Shmukraine?
As it goes, it's just another symptom of the twilight of liberalism — there is no will to upset the status quo even if the trajectory ends in an inevitable disaster. The business of selling the ropes to fascists, paraphrasing Lenin, is going good, and legally the West is not obliged to help Ukraine after all. The oh so comforting lawyering that gets liberals out of obligations under Budapest Memorandum abroad and business of enforcing constitutions at home (14th amendment, I am mourning you here).
"The oh so comforting lawyering that gets liberals out of obligations under Budapest Memorandum abroad"
What obligations did the West have under the Budapest Memorandum? To be specific, what obligations did the USA have that they have not met? (I'm genuinely asking your opinion, not trying to argue with you---adding this as intent is not always clear in a forum like this)
The USA met its obligations, and I'm not arguing that the text itself was misread (maybe by Ukraine) but there is a bigger picture, spirit vs letter if you will. Does anyone today think this agreement ended up a success? No. Will any country abandon their nuclear or other advanced weaponry in a similar fashion from now on? Not a chance. If there was any hope of nuclear non-proliferation through pacifist means, following the Budapest Memorandum to the letter is arguably a death blow to it. I think that the world would be better off if either the US went with the guaranteeing the Ukrainian territorial integrity despite them not required to do so under the memorandum, or not signing the document in the first place.
That seemed true at one point but it is possible the window closed on that. The war for Putin is probably also driven by domestic considerations so without a resounding victory, they'd have to incentivize him by doing massive damage, and scaring him a resounding victory was coming. You need a lot of troops for that. They might never have had the troops. Also, it's possible the domestic costs in his eyes were worth a further escalation, even a massive one. So it's very hard to second-guess the situation because if Putin was always all-in, Ukraine might never have had the full capacity they needed.
I have found that this conversation unleashes the more fury and even fanaticism of certain people than any topic one can discuss—perhaps even Israel/Palestine. I don’t know what the answers are but I suspect few people are looking at this in a clear-sighted way, and this makes me think that it is likely the USA does plan to contribute to a very lengthy hollowing out of their military, and deaths of people they need to rebuild the country. Vietnam is a good example because it shows it’s very hard to stop a war. Most of our engagements show this.
The wars go on long past the point where anything was gained, and when that is the case, people are dying for nothing. But they go on for domestic political reasons even when the military is very aware they cannot be won, as was the case for Vietnam.
Nuland has a lot to answer for. Not just for not supporting an end to the war in 2022, but for supporting the overthrow of Yanukovich in 2014.
Sure, he was Russia-friendly, he might even have been corrupt, but he was elected freely and fairly according to OSCE and EU observers.
His term would have been up in a year. It would have been better to fight the issue of EU accession in the 2015 election, rather than disturbing a modus vivendi. As it was, his deposition unleased some ugly Ukrainian ethnonationalism and gave an opportunity for Putin to send in his forces.
As it is now, they have to cut the best deal they can including a robust defense force to survive as an armed neutral. NATO and probably EU accession was always a pipe dream.
It was not an "overthrow" of Yanukovich, protestors did not seek to overthrow him and he chose to leave Ukraine on his own volition (or being told to by Russians if you're more conspiratorial).
1) Nuland not supporting an end to the war in 2022 probably just meant that she was consulted about what signing Istanbul agreement would mean for Ukraine. Ragozin's account that it was "Western governments" who were unhappy with Ukraine's potential demilitarisation, as opposed to Zelensky himself, seems like an obvious manipulation. "Support" for the overthrow of Yanukovich is, I guess, a fairer thing to criticise, from the point of view that it "enraged Putin" and thus was disadvantageous to Ukraine (and everyone else, as well), but I don't think her support amounted to much more than a couple of messages of "you go, guys!", which John McCain, for example, also issued; and if you have a trustworthy source of her being entangled in the "overthrow" deeper, I want to see it.
2) "He might even have been corrupt." He certainly was, and this is one of the most important reasons why the protests against him were popular. The way you phrase all of this, however, seems to hint that you give "CIA coup" theory of the events way too much credence.
3) "It would have been better to fight the issue of EU accession in the 2015 election." Democracy, obviously, is not a given. There was not a groundless fear that, given Yanukovich's (and his political forefather Kuchma's) track record, the next election will be falsified.
4) "gave an opportunity for Putin to send in his forces" A pretext, rather. And a reason. An opportunity was always there due to long-term neglect of the military.
Your early writings on Ukraine were very good and I really wasn't expecting you to promote the thoroughly debunked "Boris Johnson sank the Istanbul negotiations in 2022"-theory. (The idea that Ukraine could trade land for peace continues to be fanciful, and of course your piece does not address the question of what a permanent peace deal, one that Putin won't rip up at the first opportunity, might look like.)
If a liberal says "I support you", I hope more people understand how many unsaid qualifiers come with such so-called "support". Our support doesn't mean much more than words.
Those didn't want to give Ukraine heavier weapons much earlier in this conflict have a lot to answer for.
The lesson now is never, ever even contemplate giving nuclear weapons away. Ukraine perhaps should not have taken our security guarantees seriously back in the 1990s. Any mid-level power that does not develop nukes and keep them on standby is playing with its own fate.
Further proliferation is the only way after this. If more nation-states understand this, they may be able to avoid Ukraine's fate.
Like much discussion, this piece suffers from a failure to define terms. At the beginning of the 2022 invasion, I suggested that the best feasible outcome would be a ceasefire on pre-2022 lines. The Russian occupation of Crimea and most of Donbas would remain in effect, but unrecognised. In this context, a withdrawal from Kursk would be the trade-off for a Russian withdrawal to pre-2022 lines
That outomce would certainly be a defeat for Russia. Would you class it as a defeat for Ukraine ?
The sanctions against Russia have not worked because they are utterly toothless: Russia imports exactly as much or even more military-use hardware as they did before the war; they just have to pay a small premium because it travels through other CTSO states first. There is no real willingness on the West to do the kinds of things that might win the war, which is why Russia will inevitably be the winner.
Thanks for the interesting read. Not sure if likely, down somewhere on the road of human history reporting, anyone or any side can claim victory or accept defeat in what some or many may or may not call an ideological war. Perhaps or not, a “stalemate situation.” comes to mind. On the side of human behavior over time, accept it, reject it, love it or hate it, war is once again happening. It is sad and tragic that humanity is the victim again.
A couple of thoughts I felt were worth sharing about your article:
1. On war termination
You say “ultimately, troops just have to win battles and take territory” for Ukraine to win. We’ve both lived through two conflicts, one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan, where the US won, by conventional terms, resounding battlefield victories and secured the terrain, only to end in something other than the clear cut victory you suggest these two factors lead to. Instead, it should clue us in to a different understanding of how wars end: when both sides agree that one is the victor and the other is the vanquished. Consider the Taliban, who simply refused to concede that defeat was the product of loss of terrain or personnel against a foe with superior numbers (at least in terms of population within coalition nations) and more sophisticated weaponry. There is a case to be made that if one side fights on then the war simply isn’t over. Despite how military buffs like to imagine it, neither seizing and holding terrain nor defeating enemy forces on the battlefield inevitably results in victory and defeat. There is an intermediate step where political leadership has to decide who won and who lost.
2. The role of technology in war
I agree with you that “strategic strikes alone have never won a war.” (Historian Mark Clodfelter makes a convincing case that the physical destruction of targets by air has never directly resulted in defeat. If you haven’t read any of his work, I strongly recommend Beneficial Bombing as a starting point). But comparing long range precision munitions to the US strategic bombing campaigns in WWII or Vietnam is comparing two dissimilar things. Consider the much-discussed ATACMS: ATACMS is a ground-fired precision weapon and cannot be used for mass aerial bombardment. Getting out of the way that it isn’t a fleet of bombers, this confuses tactical or operational effects with strategic ones. I don’t know who is suggesting to you that ATACMS or other long range munitions are strategic weapons, but they aren’t. The idea is that Ukraine could employ ATACMS (and other long range precision munitions) to disrupt Russian logistics, including those inside Russia, giving advantage to Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. I agree that there are no wonder weapons, but that doesn’t mean technology is irrelevant. You state that “any sort of concerted effort to physically destroy Russia’s infrastructure risks provoking an aggressive Russian response that could lead to all-out war with NATO, a nightmare scenario.” Even if Ukraine employed US munitions with long range capabilities to strike Russian infrastructure (instead of logistics as I’ve proposed) my question is: how is destroying Russian infrastructure different than killing Russian soldiers on the ground in Ukraine? In either case, US provided munitions are being used to diminish the military capability of Russia. You refer to this as if it’s a red line we cannot cross, but the Biden administration has very timidly approached and passed each supposed red line without consequence. Keep in mind who sets those red lines. In this case, Russia did. Conceding to that kind of blackmail only demonstrates its effectiveness.
3. Manpower and technology
You say that “with less men and materiel than Russia, Ukraine’s options are limited.” If you haven’t read Stephen Biddle’s Military Power, I strongly encourage you to do so and to grapple with his argument. He makes the case that neither manpower nor technology determine battlefield outcomes. It’s a sometimes strange read given his quantitative approach, but its analysis is one I’ve returned to again and again. Please read it if you haven’t.
4. Beware flawed historical analogies
“If this business about demonstrating resolve and “commitment” sounds fishy to you it’s because it was part of the same Cold War thinking that got us increasingly entangled in Vietnam.”
Again, I think the comparison is off here. If I was accusing you of being deliberately nefarious I would say it’s a sleight of hand, but I tend to think it’s just a misunderstanding. Comparing the US backing of France and later South Vietnam against an anti-colonial insurgency is not the same as backing a democratic nation battling an invasion by an authoritarian regime. US intervention in Korea and Vietnam was predicated on a false belief in the domino theory. No one is alleging a global communist conspiracy in this case (at least not that I’m aware of). Instead of a conspiracy, this is an aggressor nation seeking to reestablish an empire. Russia is waging an imperial war, not an anti-colonial one. If you want to make a historical analogy, why the US in Vietnam instead of the Soviets in Afghanistan?
5. Postwar realism
Finally, you suggest that Ukraine needs to be realistic about its prospects for victory. We also need to be realistic about what victory looks like to Russia. Russia has a say in any negotiations (although we often talk as if this issue rests solely with Ukraine), and we have to ask what Russia’s goals are, and if any peace (which Russia has shown they will willingly violate) can be secured in the long term even with concessions. If Russia’s goals remain unchanged, peace can provide a time to better prepare for the next war. (Yes, I realize I’m leaving myself open to criticism I’m making a Munich analogy)
I hope you don’t dismiss this as “cope.” I liked When the Clock Broke and a lot of your other work, but I think there are enough flaws here that it warrants discussion. My comments are far from implying that “if the US just gave Ukraine ATACMS, then Ukraine would win.” I don’t see victory as inevitable regardless of the lethal aid the US provides - but I don’t see defeat as inevitable unless the US and other nations withdraw their support.
I brought up Biddle because if we’re talking about the role of manpower and material, then we’re talking about factors that are believed to profoundly influence or determine battlefield outcomes. His analysis is different, which can shift the way material and manpower strengths are discussed.
Two points regarding the concept of the war as one of attrition. We talk about “wars of attrition” as if they’re a condition that is irreversible. History shows multiple wars that, at one point, could be described as wars of attrition, but later saw armies maneuver. Consider the kaiserschlacht and the Meuse-Argonne offensive of 1918.
Second, this ignores the naval war, where Ukraine has been remarkably successful. Forcing the relocation of the Black Sea Fleet is not a negligible accomplishment, but one that gets ignored in discussions of the war as a statement or a war of attrition.
Final thought: if the Russians are favored materially, as you suggest, why are they turning to North Korea and Iran for munitions? This behavior suggests any material advantage they are presumed to possess it isn’t that clear cut.
Very interesting and knowledgeable. Would you be willing to give a short precis of Biddle's argument? I'm especially curious about what he might say about comparative resource levels in the broad sense (not only manpower, but finance, materials, etc.) and war outcomes ("battlefield outcomes" and "war outcomes" being not necessarily the same thing).
Biddle argues that since 1918 the defining factor in determining the outcome of battle in mid to high intensity conflicts has remained constant. He concludes that force employment, the modern system by which forces are used operationally and tactically employed in combat, determines that outcome. This contrasts sharply with other scholars who point towards technology or numerical superiority. Biddle recognizes these factors, arguing that technology amplifies the effects of force employment, but that neither can overcome it.
Biddle first uses three historical case studies to examine his thesis of force employment’s prominence. Biddle examines the second battle of the Somme in 1918, Operation Goodwood, the Allied attempt to break out of Normandy in 1944, and Desert Storm. These constitute a small-n analysis, which Biddle pairs with a large-n statistical analysis and simulation modeling.
His analysis is focused solely on ground combat and he does not discuss larger issues of mobilization or morale.
As you seem to suggest in your last sentence, it sounds like Biddle is distinctly focused on battle outcomes, not whole wars. This makes him sound somewhat specialized and, with respect, perhaps beside the larger point in reference to Ukraine. While battles are important, it seems to me that the outcome of a whole war, especially in modern conditions, is often not simply a sum of the battles fought in it. With reference to Ukraine specifically, I might *tentatively* suggest that, while a series of spectacular battlefield victories in the first year or so might have won the war by altering political conditions in Russia, at this point, the prospect of a battlefield victory on Ukraine's part that would actually cause Russia to regard itself as defeated *in the war as a whole* seems somewhat unlikely. To me, this now looks like a war of attrition, and the material fundamentals seem to favor Russia (again, not in any one battle, but in the whole war) absent unlikely massive political changes in the US and/or its European allies toward much, much more energetic, self-sacrificing support.
Assuming that Putin is interested in the kind of deal here proposed, then the result will be a severely weakened Ukraine with, at best, guarantees from the West and Russia like the previous guarantees that were abandoned. Putin's explicit goal, the end of Ukraine as a nation, whether through another and better prepared invasion or by other means, will then obviously be only a matter of time. So the real question is, are the Ukrainians so beaten that they are willing for their children to be Russians?
I think bilateral security arrangements like South Korea's might work.
What about the Minsk Agreement? Guarantees all round when Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal. Including from Russia, whose guarantees were clearly not worth the paper they were written on. It's existential for Ukraine, because Putin doesn't believe Ukraine even has a right to exist and indeed should only be a province of Russia without even its own language or culture. Russia has shown Ukrainians that there is no acceptable future for them under the Russian jackboot.Take your argument forward to after Ukraine's capitulation and you would have to allow Moldova, Georgia etc just to fold in front of Russian intransigence. And then why not Poland and the Baltics? Ukraine has done pretty well so far in the face of dithering by Biden and outright obstruction by Putin-friendly Republicans. Don't blame the Ukrainians for their battlefield difficulties. Moreover, if you look at what they are doing to the Russian economy with their own new generation of drones, you might not want to write them off too soon.
"Ukraine has done pretty well so far"
This might not be enough at this point, especially if half of Europe is champing at the bit to lift sanctions and let bygones be bygones.
Uh, maybe so, like if we station 20,000 or so US (and other NATO) troops in Ukraine? And the Russians agree to that?
The idea of new US security commitments in Europe seems questionable in the current US political context. Even if, for example, the Dems won both the WH and one or both houses of Congress, the commitments would be seen as untrustworthy, since the Republicans will eventually return and may well retain their new isolationist (at least, in regard to Europe) bent.
How is this less of a cope than contra-spem-spero Ukraine boosterists' war plans?
From the creators of "a NATO jet firing at a missile aimed at a fucking Uzhgorod will start nuclear war" comes the game-changing security arrangement of "we'll teach you how to build the hottest military technology of 1969 in a factory you won't be able to shield from Russian fire with labor that fled the country two years ago, with money you won't have (and also we'll maybe share some intelligence information with you sometimes, if we feel like it)".
Hmm.
I have some thoughts on this assessment. Ukraine wants long range capabilities to continue what they’ve been doing with their own *home grown* long range drones - destroying ammunition depots (3 last week, one supposedly *impenetrable, even by nukes* - per the Russians) and oil refineries/fuel storage. The invasion of Kursk was well planned and had the most exceptional opsec of anything seen in this war. The Russians are starved for ammunition (see above) and manpower - just as the Ukrainians are. Now that the war has come to Russian soil, even Russian pollsters are finding widening discontent with the war and more and more are expressing the desire to get out of the war by ceding back all the territory they’ve stolen over the last 10 years. The Russian economy is fucked. Inflation is running around 9.5% and is expected to rise next year. Their central bank just raised interest rates to 19%, which is great for Russians fighting and dying in the war since Putin keeps giving away more and more money and there’s nothing to buy and savings rates are very high. Sanctions are being skirted for some luxury goods and of course for dual purpose tech, but they’ve not been able to find suitable replacements for the goods from companies that pulled out in 2022. China doesn’t make nice stuff. (We could’ve told them that!) Yes, the Ukrainians are suffering and this winter looks like it could be very bad. Yesterday, Germany announced a package to (partially) address that. We are finally giving them more air defense systems. And TBH, just like when Biden authorized the Ukrainians getting ATACMS and not stating it publicly until they’d already successfully used them on a bunch of Russian kit, I wouldn’t be surprised if the same happens for the authorization of using them on Russian territory before it gets made public.
If you spend an hour reading Russian (“dissident”) and Ukrainian media and stop reading the garbage coming out in most western outlets, you’ll get a much better understanding of what’s going on. Western media shades everything through the lens - usually partisan - of whatever *expert(s)* they’ve spoken to for the article. There are hawks and doves in every national security apparatus, just as there are those who’ve watched every red line Putin has laid down being crossed with no response beyond the usual and saying “let’s give the Ukrainians more” and those that see this and say “but the next red line might be the real one”. Basically, we can live in fear or give Ukraine what it needs to nip the Russian bear’s nose good and hard, here and now and end Putin’s ability to scare leaders into making decisions that are in the best interest of Russia and not necessarily those of the country making those decisions.
Precisely. Meduza inter alia, along with Kyiv Post, Euromaidan, Moscow Times. Too many people swallow the Moscow disinformation narratives. Admittedly it does help if you read Russian and/or Ukrainian, but it's never too late to start learning them. Even if you don't, a lot of these sources translate many of their news and analysis articles into English. Am I glad of my Slavic studies from university days!
Precisely. Meduza inter alia, along with Kyiv Post, Euromaidan, Moscow Times. Too many people swallow the Moscow disinformation narratives. Admittedly it does help if you read Russian and/or Ukrainian, but it's never too late to start learning them. Even if you don't, a lot of these sources translate many of their news and analysis articles into English. Am I glad of my Slavic studies from university days!
Precisely. Meduza inter alia, along with Kyiv Post, Euromaidan, Moscow Times. Too many people swallow the Moscow disinformation narratives. Admittedly it does help if you read Russian and/or Ukrainian, but it's never too late to start learning them. Even if you don't, a lot of these sources translate many of their news and analysis articles into English. Am I glad of my Slavic studies from university days!
I'm a fan of your writing, John, but, speaking as a Ukraine expert, this one misses the mark, I think. As I've written before, calls for "peace" overlook two crucial facts. First, any land-for-peace deal will lead not to "peace" but to mass killings, ethnic cleansing, filtration camps, arbitrary detentions, torture, etc. for the millions of Ukrainians permanently consigned to Russian occupation - which is precisely why the Ukrainian public overwhelmingly opposes it.
Second, leaving aside its undesirability, such a deal would probably be impossible to implement. So intense is opposition to the prospect in Ukraine that if Zelensky tried to sign one, he'd likely be ousted, legally or extra-legally. It would also spark a pro-Ukrainian insurgency in the east that continues the fight against Russia. So, no matter how much the West wants it, and no matter whether Ukraine's leadership tries it, a negotiated settlement just isn't going to work.
The only way forward is to give Ukraine what it needs to win - not just the armaments but the freedom to use them. I'm no military strategist, but strategists I respect do believe that long-range precision capabilities are a precondition for Ukrainian victory - in particular by damaging Russian supply lines to the point that would enable the kind of battlefield air superiority that wins modern wars. See, for example, this: https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/a-new-strategy-for-ukraine-is-needed?utm_source=post-banner&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=posts-open-in-app&triedRedirect=true
The longer the West delays this stuff, the less leverage it will have over where and how Ukraine fights. That's already happening, as the Kursk invasion shows. And it can potentially become far, far worse, as far as the West is concerned (think assassinations of Russian diplomats and business people in Western capitals, a revival of Ukraine's nuclear program, etc., etc.). The only way to maintain any leverage over Ukraine in this regard is to give it what it needs to win, and soon.
BTW, Ragozin is not really a serious person. He demonstrated this once again in the piece you reference, which is based on a fundamental misreading of Ukrainian political realities, the Minsk process, etc. It wasn't the West that stopped Ukraine from signing a deal in April 2022; the Ukrainian leadership itself chose not to sign it, largely because - as leaked documents show - Russia made last-minute changes which would have left Ukraine militarily neutered and without any possibility of Western backing in the event Russia broke the terms. He also completely distorts the Minsk process; it was not Zelensky who abandoned Minsk (an unworkable deal to begin with); Zelensky betrayed an almost precious naiveté in believing Minsk could still be salvaged only to learn otherwise once Russia continued to insist on a method of implementation that would have consigned the Donbas to permanent Russian vassalage.
Apologies for the long-winded reply!
The people who wanted and still want to delay heavier weapons as one kind of pretend non-escalation have a lot to answer for. If we had given them the breadth of tools we are given them now at the begining of the war, things would be different.
Agreed.
Hi John,
Long-time listener, first time caller. I just wanted to comment on your recent Ukraine piece. While the piece is very thoughtful, I think you're wrong to suggest Ukraine intends to use long-range strike capabilities to attack Russian economic or civilian infrastructure. If there's an analogy to be made, it's to Germany's hunt for "Wunderwaffen"--not to Allied strategic bombing or Vietnam.
I think it's reasonably clear that Ukraine's primary motivation for securing Western long-range weapons is to attack Russian air bases and military logistics. This is hinted at in the Times piece you link and discussed more explicitly elsewhere, like in this BBC piece: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0rwkk9r51jo
In recent months, the Russians have used long-range air-launched weapons to great effect, most famously the so-called "glide bombs." The Ukrainians have struggled to respond to these threats. These weapons are launched too far from the front for air defense systems (already stretched thin) to be very effective. Efforts to attack distant airfields with home-grown Ukrainian weapons have seen mixed results. The Ukrainians seem to believe that Western long-range strike capabilities might be more effective in attacking these airfields and deterring Russian use of these weapons. This has been stated explicitly as the motivation for long-range strike when Ukrainians have spoken to the Western press.
The Ukrainians also seem to believe these weapons would allow them to strike Russian logistics capabilities currently safe in the Russian rear. Again, they are trying to use homegrown munitions to strike these areas. They have seen some successes--they recently were able to destroy a number of Russian ammunition dumps--but they seem to believe Western weapons will be more effective here.
My guess is that they are hoping to replicate the successes seen when the HIMARs system was first deployed to Ukraine -- HIMARs, by extending the range of Ukrainian capabilities, allowed Ukraine to aggressively target Russia's logistics and command assets, inflicting substantial damage until the Russians adapted.
I am not aware of any evidence suggesting Ukrainians intended to use Western weapons against Russian economic infrastructure. Ukrainians have attacked some Russian oil depots and the pipeline but, for the most part, they've refrained from engaging in the kind of strategic strike campaign you've described.
Western weapons would not enable them to engage in such a strike campaign. There are just not enough weapons. There were, for instance, just ~4,000 ATCAMs--the U.S. missile that would be used in these strikes-- originally produced. There are more French/UK SCALP/Storm Shadow weapons but there simply aren't enough for the kind of strategic campaign you're describing.
In short, Ukraine seems focused on generating battlefield effects, not strategic ones. This is not a case of them trying to replicate Vietnam or the Allied bombing campaign.
The question, however, is if Western weapons would actually be able to generate meaningful battlefield effects. Western intelligence, as the Times article points out, is skeptical that long-range strike would have a long-term impact on Russian air capabilities. And there is a reasonable expectation that the Russian logistics infrastructure will eventually adapt to whatever pressure these weapons can bring to bear.
Fundamentally, there's not really a convincing case that these weapons will be game changers. But Ukrainian leadership, up against the wall, has convinced itself that access to these advanced weapons will allow it to push back a larger and steadily advancing foe. Wunderwaffen.
The liberal West could make Ukraine achieve robust negotiating position (if not "win") if it was willing to rattle the status quo — seriously crack down on trade with Russia or invest in its own war production. This is not about money even, which the West clearly thinks it has a shortage of, but about making military production cost close to material and countless other things. Actions that would involve cutting off money spigots to various interest groups, in MIC and civilian conglomerates dealing in Russia both. This sounds conspiratorial, but it is not really, for example, why would VP of Russia in PepsiCo voluntarily agree to his department's closure? Because Ukraine Shmukraine?
As it goes, it's just another symptom of the twilight of liberalism — there is no will to upset the status quo even if the trajectory ends in an inevitable disaster. The business of selling the ropes to fascists, paraphrasing Lenin, is going good, and legally the West is not obliged to help Ukraine after all. The oh so comforting lawyering that gets liberals out of obligations under Budapest Memorandum abroad and business of enforcing constitutions at home (14th amendment, I am mourning you here).
"The oh so comforting lawyering that gets liberals out of obligations under Budapest Memorandum abroad"
What obligations did the West have under the Budapest Memorandum? To be specific, what obligations did the USA have that they have not met? (I'm genuinely asking your opinion, not trying to argue with you---adding this as intent is not always clear in a forum like this)
The USA met its obligations, and I'm not arguing that the text itself was misread (maybe by Ukraine) but there is a bigger picture, spirit vs letter if you will. Does anyone today think this agreement ended up a success? No. Will any country abandon their nuclear or other advanced weaponry in a similar fashion from now on? Not a chance. If there was any hope of nuclear non-proliferation through pacifist means, following the Budapest Memorandum to the letter is arguably a death blow to it. I think that the world would be better off if either the US went with the guaranteeing the Ukrainian territorial integrity despite them not required to do so under the memorandum, or not signing the document in the first place.
My gut feeling is that Europe and the US should help them more, but there doesn't seem to be any appetite here for that.
That seemed true at one point but it is possible the window closed on that. The war for Putin is probably also driven by domestic considerations so without a resounding victory, they'd have to incentivize him by doing massive damage, and scaring him a resounding victory was coming. You need a lot of troops for that. They might never have had the troops. Also, it's possible the domestic costs in his eyes were worth a further escalation, even a massive one. So it's very hard to second-guess the situation because if Putin was always all-in, Ukraine might never have had the full capacity they needed.
I have found that this conversation unleashes the more fury and even fanaticism of certain people than any topic one can discuss—perhaps even Israel/Palestine. I don’t know what the answers are but I suspect few people are looking at this in a clear-sighted way, and this makes me think that it is likely the USA does plan to contribute to a very lengthy hollowing out of their military, and deaths of people they need to rebuild the country. Vietnam is a good example because it shows it’s very hard to stop a war. Most of our engagements show this.
The wars go on long past the point where anything was gained, and when that is the case, people are dying for nothing. But they go on for domestic political reasons even when the military is very aware they cannot be won, as was the case for Vietnam.
Nuland has a lot to answer for. Not just for not supporting an end to the war in 2022, but for supporting the overthrow of Yanukovich in 2014.
Sure, he was Russia-friendly, he might even have been corrupt, but he was elected freely and fairly according to OSCE and EU observers.
His term would have been up in a year. It would have been better to fight the issue of EU accession in the 2015 election, rather than disturbing a modus vivendi. As it was, his deposition unleased some ugly Ukrainian ethnonationalism and gave an opportunity for Putin to send in his forces.
As it is now, they have to cut the best deal they can including a robust defense force to survive as an armed neutral. NATO and probably EU accession was always a pipe dream.
It was not an "overthrow" of Yanukovich, protestors did not seek to overthrow him and he chose to leave Ukraine on his own volition (or being told to by Russians if you're more conspiratorial).
She didn’t support his overthrow; she tried to pursue a deal that would have kept him on as president while appointing a PM from the opposition. I explain here, with receipts: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1761873996675682423.html
1) Nuland not supporting an end to the war in 2022 probably just meant that she was consulted about what signing Istanbul agreement would mean for Ukraine. Ragozin's account that it was "Western governments" who were unhappy with Ukraine's potential demilitarisation, as opposed to Zelensky himself, seems like an obvious manipulation. "Support" for the overthrow of Yanukovich is, I guess, a fairer thing to criticise, from the point of view that it "enraged Putin" and thus was disadvantageous to Ukraine (and everyone else, as well), but I don't think her support amounted to much more than a couple of messages of "you go, guys!", which John McCain, for example, also issued; and if you have a trustworthy source of her being entangled in the "overthrow" deeper, I want to see it.
2) "He might even have been corrupt." He certainly was, and this is one of the most important reasons why the protests against him were popular. The way you phrase all of this, however, seems to hint that you give "CIA coup" theory of the events way too much credence.
3) "It would have been better to fight the issue of EU accession in the 2015 election." Democracy, obviously, is not a given. There was not a groundless fear that, given Yanukovich's (and his political forefather Kuchma's) track record, the next election will be falsified.
4) "gave an opportunity for Putin to send in his forces" A pretext, rather. And a reason. An opportunity was always there due to long-term neglect of the military.
Your early writings on Ukraine were very good and I really wasn't expecting you to promote the thoroughly debunked "Boris Johnson sank the Istanbul negotiations in 2022"-theory. (The idea that Ukraine could trade land for peace continues to be fanciful, and of course your piece does not address the question of what a permanent peace deal, one that Putin won't rip up at the first opportunity, might look like.)
I did not promote that.
If a liberal says "I support you", I hope more people understand how many unsaid qualifiers come with such so-called "support". Our support doesn't mean much more than words.
Fascists are not the only bad allies, it seems.
Those didn't want to give Ukraine heavier weapons much earlier in this conflict have a lot to answer for.
The lesson now is never, ever even contemplate giving nuclear weapons away. Ukraine perhaps should not have taken our security guarantees seriously back in the 1990s. Any mid-level power that does not develop nukes and keep them on standby is playing with its own fate.
Further proliferation is the only way after this. If more nation-states understand this, they may be able to avoid Ukraine's fate.
Like much discussion, this piece suffers from a failure to define terms. At the beginning of the 2022 invasion, I suggested that the best feasible outcome would be a ceasefire on pre-2022 lines. The Russian occupation of Crimea and most of Donbas would remain in effect, but unrecognised. In this context, a withdrawal from Kursk would be the trade-off for a Russian withdrawal to pre-2022 lines
That outomce would certainly be a defeat for Russia. Would you class it as a defeat for Ukraine ?
The sanctions against Russia have not worked because they are utterly toothless: Russia imports exactly as much or even more military-use hardware as they did before the war; they just have to pay a small premium because it travels through other CTSO states first. There is no real willingness on the West to do the kinds of things that might win the war, which is why Russia will inevitably be the winner.
Thanks for the interesting read. Not sure if likely, down somewhere on the road of human history reporting, anyone or any side can claim victory or accept defeat in what some or many may or may not call an ideological war. Perhaps or not, a “stalemate situation.” comes to mind. On the side of human behavior over time, accept it, reject it, love it or hate it, war is once again happening. It is sad and tragic that humanity is the victim again.
I think it’s inevitable that Ukraine’s military will feel ‘stabbed in the back’ one way or another.