There is a tendency for intellectuals to think ideologies move the world. And maybe they do. But in the case of what is happening in the Ukraine, Putin’s views are nothing special. He is in accord with Gorbachov and Yeltsin and, it seems, most everyone else in Russia in seeing the US (and its Nato covering for we all know Nato is just a weird spelling for USA) as a threat and in the business of destabilizing it. Nor, so far as I can tell, is this view delusional. The US wants a unipolar world with it as sole pole. Whoever demurs from this picture is an enemy. Right now the prime enemies are China and Russia. So, Putin acts accordingly. We dont need Arendt or worldviews to explain this. It is far too Putin-centric, and really misses what is going on.
This sounds like (yet) another example of a certain type of American parochialism on the left that assigns agency to America alone. All other players in world affairs function as cameo players to America's protagonist. Perhaps one of the worst consequences of this type of analysis is that it absolves people of the responsibility to actually *learn* something about other societies and their citizens, thus reinforcing the parochialism. It's a perspective that doesn't require one to actually know anything about Russia or anybody else, indeed it rewards and incentivizes ignorance of other places.
No. I have no problem assigning agency to Russia. They acted after all. My point is not to deprive them of agency but to see what motivates the agent. I disagree with JG that we need to delve into Putin’s mind to find the reason for Russia’s actions. In my iew, he is doing what most experts expected Russia to eventually do when US Nato pushed up to Russia’s borders. That is, to push back. I say this because his views of US Nato actions is in sync with those of Yeltsin and Gorbachov before him and seem to reflect the view of virtually every Russian in a political leadership position. Apparently even the Atlanticists (e.g. Medvedev) are in sync on this. So, we don’t need to delve into Putin’s beliefs or his psyche to understand what Russia is doing.
Sometimes other people act from motives special to them, sometimes they act as anybody (or most people) would if in the same circumstances. I think Russia’s current actions are of the second variety. In fact, they are exactly what the US would do if there were, say, missiles placed nearby that threatened the US mainland (I am sure you can guess why I believe this). Russia sees the US/Nato as a threat. It want stomitigate that threat by neutralizing Ukraine and, if possible, the rest of Eastern Europe. In other words, it wants what the US promised before the unification of Germany; not one step past the Oder. Frankly, to me, their worries seem reasonable. That neither the US nor Nato treated them as such is why we are in this mess right now.
Clearly I hit a nerve. So sorry. I actually enjoy your pieces in general. But I disagree with the emphasis in this one. I read your piece as suggesting that To understand what is happening in Ukraine one must focus on Putin and his views. The main idea seems to be that he has specific somewhat odd views about Russia, Imperilism, Communism, and Capitalism that once we understand them makes sense of what is happening in Ukraine. I think that this is a plausible view to take in some cases, but not this one. The reason is that Putin’s views about the threat of US/NATO to Russia are neither idiosyncratic nor driven mainly by ideology. His views are widely shared across the Russian leadership and his discomfort with US/NATO intentions have been seconded by many in the west that can understand why he thinks what he does about the threat. These westerners include Jack Matlock, George Kennan, Mearsheimer, among others. All saw sense to doing what Putin suggested long ago (and seconded by Gorbachov and Yeltsin before) that NATO not be in eastern Europe. Neutralizing Ukraine would do that, and Putin claimed that would have ended matters. We actually don't know if that is true as it was rejected forthwith. So, here is my point: if this is correct then as interesting as your views of Putin are, they probably don’t bear on the current situation. Moreover, focusing on Putin’s idiosyncratic philosophy muddies the waters, so doing so is unhelpful.
Last point: I don’t think I have it ALL figured out. But I believe that this is unnecessary to have figured out enough. Things are playing out the way people predicted they would went NATO moved to Russia’s borders. That was predicted. The wuestion is why now and not earlier or later? I have no idea. But one thing that seems relevant is that Russia thinks that it is now or never for them. That is what Putin said in his speech. Seems plausible, but I could be wrong.
At any rate, sorry for brushing your fur the wrong way. I love this blog, but did not really agree with this post. That happens, I am told.
Yeah I think this realist business actually obscures more than it reveals. I don't think his views are idiosyncratic at all. As the interview with Putin's advisor points out, this is a widely shared set of views in the post-Soviet elite.
What does it obscure? You doubt that there is a realist case or you doubt that putin is moved by realist considerations, or you dont believe leaders act from realist motives, or…?
We likely both agree that people act out of beliefs in response to their circumstances. This is a truism. What you seem to be saying is that IN THIS CASE someone with views different from Putin’s but sensitive to Russia’s position and US/Nato policy would likely have not been concerned by what has been happening on Russia’s border, or would have been but would have not seen any reason to push back, or…? Please expand.
I'm not really interested in having an extended discussion on the subject, I believe the piece speaks for itself and you clearly have your own very developed views on the subject. But I don't really believe in realism's conceit of an overarching rationality to state actors decisions that doesn't take into account particulars. Putin has a grievance with NATO, that is true. But much of his speech was based on his own revanchist beliefs about the collapse of the Russian state and empire, views highlighted in this interview with his former advisor. If you don't think that's enlightening, and you think your framework provides the better understanding, that's great, I don't find it personally persuasive.
Putin seems to me to be ideologically fluid - he is a pragmatic strongman kleptocrat with a chip on his shoulder for the West, which he uses to justify his aggression and abuses. He seems to have absolutely no moral boundaries. But his goals together with the elite he serves are cementing their power and impunity first and foremost. This impulse guides like 99.9% of Russian autocratic leadership’s decision making as far as I can tell - protecting and preserving the enormous pile of stolen wealth and power.
My $0.02, the major misunderstanding of Putin and this conflict surrounds Russia’s position that it is threatened. EuroMaidan was so threatening to Putin and cronies not because NATO would invade Russia next with tanks and guns. But eventually, the West’s culture and values would eventually invade with protest mantras and demands for ousting leadership. Having Russia border a functional liberal state is the threat Russian leadership seeks to neutralize - it is existential only to autocratic leadership however, not Russia as a state or to Russian citizens.
The “Mauripol plan” floated to Paul Manafort to entice him during the 2016 presidential campaign demonstrates Russia’s goals to create independent vassal states with puppet leadership from Ukraine’s eastern provinces dates back to at least 2016, and that their assistance/outreach to Trump’s campaign was largely part of this same conflict, same attempt for Russia’s leadership to secure itself.
I'm not sure how familiar you are with Vladimir Zhirinovsky, but if you haven't read The Last Break Southward, I'd highly recommend it. Zhirinovsky isn't representative of Putin's own views, but he does summarize the farthest extreme of Kremlin-approved Russian nationalism. Basically, he argues that Russia should reconquer all former Soviet territory, plus Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. He also helpfully offers to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by transferring Palestinians to Russia's newly conquered territory in the Middle East. I could go on, but the point is, I think the Kremlin-controlled opposition parties are endlessly interesting.
There is a tendency for intellectuals to think ideologies move the world. And maybe they do. But in the case of what is happening in the Ukraine, Putin’s views are nothing special. He is in accord with Gorbachov and Yeltsin and, it seems, most everyone else in Russia in seeing the US (and its Nato covering for we all know Nato is just a weird spelling for USA) as a threat and in the business of destabilizing it. Nor, so far as I can tell, is this view delusional. The US wants a unipolar world with it as sole pole. Whoever demurs from this picture is an enemy. Right now the prime enemies are China and Russia. So, Putin acts accordingly. We dont need Arendt or worldviews to explain this. It is far too Putin-centric, and really misses what is going on.
This sounds like (yet) another example of a certain type of American parochialism on the left that assigns agency to America alone. All other players in world affairs function as cameo players to America's protagonist. Perhaps one of the worst consequences of this type of analysis is that it absolves people of the responsibility to actually *learn* something about other societies and their citizens, thus reinforcing the parochialism. It's a perspective that doesn't require one to actually know anything about Russia or anybody else, indeed it rewards and incentivizes ignorance of other places.
No. I have no problem assigning agency to Russia. They acted after all. My point is not to deprive them of agency but to see what motivates the agent. I disagree with JG that we need to delve into Putin’s mind to find the reason for Russia’s actions. In my iew, he is doing what most experts expected Russia to eventually do when US Nato pushed up to Russia’s borders. That is, to push back. I say this because his views of US Nato actions is in sync with those of Yeltsin and Gorbachov before him and seem to reflect the view of virtually every Russian in a political leadership position. Apparently even the Atlanticists (e.g. Medvedev) are in sync on this. So, we don’t need to delve into Putin’s beliefs or his psyche to understand what Russia is doing.
Sometimes other people act from motives special to them, sometimes they act as anybody (or most people) would if in the same circumstances. I think Russia’s current actions are of the second variety. In fact, they are exactly what the US would do if there were, say, missiles placed nearby that threatened the US mainland (I am sure you can guess why I believe this). Russia sees the US/Nato as a threat. It want stomitigate that threat by neutralizing Ukraine and, if possible, the rest of Eastern Europe. In other words, it wants what the US promised before the unification of Germany; not one step past the Oder. Frankly, to me, their worries seem reasonable. That neither the US nor Nato treated them as such is why we are in this mess right now.
Okay, so don't bother reading me if you've got it all figured out already.
Clearly I hit a nerve. So sorry. I actually enjoy your pieces in general. But I disagree with the emphasis in this one. I read your piece as suggesting that To understand what is happening in Ukraine one must focus on Putin and his views. The main idea seems to be that he has specific somewhat odd views about Russia, Imperilism, Communism, and Capitalism that once we understand them makes sense of what is happening in Ukraine. I think that this is a plausible view to take in some cases, but not this one. The reason is that Putin’s views about the threat of US/NATO to Russia are neither idiosyncratic nor driven mainly by ideology. His views are widely shared across the Russian leadership and his discomfort with US/NATO intentions have been seconded by many in the west that can understand why he thinks what he does about the threat. These westerners include Jack Matlock, George Kennan, Mearsheimer, among others. All saw sense to doing what Putin suggested long ago (and seconded by Gorbachov and Yeltsin before) that NATO not be in eastern Europe. Neutralizing Ukraine would do that, and Putin claimed that would have ended matters. We actually don't know if that is true as it was rejected forthwith. So, here is my point: if this is correct then as interesting as your views of Putin are, they probably don’t bear on the current situation. Moreover, focusing on Putin’s idiosyncratic philosophy muddies the waters, so doing so is unhelpful.
Last point: I don’t think I have it ALL figured out. But I believe that this is unnecessary to have figured out enough. Things are playing out the way people predicted they would went NATO moved to Russia’s borders. That was predicted. The wuestion is why now and not earlier or later? I have no idea. But one thing that seems relevant is that Russia thinks that it is now or never for them. That is what Putin said in his speech. Seems plausible, but I could be wrong.
At any rate, sorry for brushing your fur the wrong way. I love this blog, but did not really agree with this post. That happens, I am told.
Yeah I think this realist business actually obscures more than it reveals. I don't think his views are idiosyncratic at all. As the interview with Putin's advisor points out, this is a widely shared set of views in the post-Soviet elite.
What does it obscure? You doubt that there is a realist case or you doubt that putin is moved by realist considerations, or you dont believe leaders act from realist motives, or…?
We likely both agree that people act out of beliefs in response to their circumstances. This is a truism. What you seem to be saying is that IN THIS CASE someone with views different from Putin’s but sensitive to Russia’s position and US/Nato policy would likely have not been concerned by what has been happening on Russia’s border, or would have been but would have not seen any reason to push back, or…? Please expand.
I'm not really interested in having an extended discussion on the subject, I believe the piece speaks for itself and you clearly have your own very developed views on the subject. But I don't really believe in realism's conceit of an overarching rationality to state actors decisions that doesn't take into account particulars. Putin has a grievance with NATO, that is true. But much of his speech was based on his own revanchist beliefs about the collapse of the Russian state and empire, views highlighted in this interview with his former advisor. If you don't think that's enlightening, and you think your framework provides the better understanding, that's great, I don't find it personally persuasive.
Fascinating insights. Thank you.
Putin seems to me to be ideologically fluid - he is a pragmatic strongman kleptocrat with a chip on his shoulder for the West, which he uses to justify his aggression and abuses. He seems to have absolutely no moral boundaries. But his goals together with the elite he serves are cementing their power and impunity first and foremost. This impulse guides like 99.9% of Russian autocratic leadership’s decision making as far as I can tell - protecting and preserving the enormous pile of stolen wealth and power.
My $0.02, the major misunderstanding of Putin and this conflict surrounds Russia’s position that it is threatened. EuroMaidan was so threatening to Putin and cronies not because NATO would invade Russia next with tanks and guns. But eventually, the West’s culture and values would eventually invade with protest mantras and demands for ousting leadership. Having Russia border a functional liberal state is the threat Russian leadership seeks to neutralize - it is existential only to autocratic leadership however, not Russia as a state or to Russian citizens.
The “Mauripol plan” floated to Paul Manafort to entice him during the 2016 presidential campaign demonstrates Russia’s goals to create independent vassal states with puppet leadership from Ukraine’s eastern provinces dates back to at least 2016, and that their assistance/outreach to Trump’s campaign was largely part of this same conflict, same attempt for Russia’s leadership to secure itself.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/magazine/russiagate-paul-manafort-ukraine-war.html
Alexander Vindman says, start with the proposition that Putin is not suicidal. I wish I could.
I'm not sure how familiar you are with Vladimir Zhirinovsky, but if you haven't read The Last Break Southward, I'd highly recommend it. Zhirinovsky isn't representative of Putin's own views, but he does summarize the farthest extreme of Kremlin-approved Russian nationalism. Basically, he argues that Russia should reconquer all former Soviet territory, plus Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. He also helpfully offers to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by transferring Palestinians to Russia's newly conquered territory in the Middle East. I could go on, but the point is, I think the Kremlin-controlled opposition parties are endlessly interesting.